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CASE COMMENTS
SECURITIES REGULATION - SEcuRrTIs ACT OF 1933 - RELIANCE ON
MANAGEMENT'S REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE ACCURACY OF MATERIAL
FACTS IN REGISTRATION STATEMENT WILL BAR COMPANY COUNSEL WHO ARE
DIRECTORS, UNDERWRITERS, AND ACCOUNTANTS FROM ASSERTING AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES OF SECTION 11(B)(3)(A) AND (B) IN SECTION 11 ACTIONS. -
On March 30, 1961, BarChris Construction Corporation [BarChris] filed a regis-
tration statement pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933' covering
a $3,500,000 offering of 5y% convertible subordinated debentures due May
1, 1976. The original registration statement was amended on May 11, 1961,
and again on May 16, 1961, the effective date of the statement. According to
the prospectus contained in the registration statement,2 the purpose of the
issue was to finance construction of a new plant, develop a new equipment line,
cover a loan to a wholly owned subsidiary, and contribute funds to BarChris's
working capital. On May 24, 1961, BarChris received the net proceeds from
the sale of the debentures. Primarily because of customer delinquencies and
defaults, the financial position of the corporation rapidly deteriorated, and, on
October 29, 1962, it filed a petition for arrangement under chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act.3 Four days earlier, nine plaintiff bondholders had brought a
class action4 under section 11 of the Securities Act5 naming as defendants the
1 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1964).
Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 68 Stat. 684 '(1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964) makes it illegal
to use the mails or interstate commerce to sell securities unless a registration statement per-
taining to the securities has been filed with the S.E.C. Excepted from this requirement are
securities exempted from registration by the Securities Act of 1933 § 3, 48 Stat. 75 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964), or Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 78 Stat. 580 (1964),
15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964). The information needed in the registration statement is prescribed
by the Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1964).
2 While the prospectus was once considered a supplement to the material contained in
the registration statement, at the present time it is viewed as "the basic part of the state-
ment." See 3 L. Loss, SEcuaRTiEs REGULATION 1721-22 '(2d ed.1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss].
3 The chapter XI bankruptcy proceeding was converted into a straight bankruptcy in
March, 1963. The adjudication in bankruptcy was vacated in November of 1963, and the
company was placed in reorganization under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. The last
proceeding was still pending in March of 1968. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643, 654 n.5 '(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
4 The action was maintained under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) (3) before
this rule was changed by the 1966 amendment. Id. at 704-05.
5 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, in
relevant part provides that:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time
of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in
equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue-
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions)
or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
'(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement
as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or
partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
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signers of the registration statement, the directors of the corporation, the under-
writers of the debenture issue, and BarChris's auditors.6 Subsequently, fifty-nine
purchasers of the debenture issue were granted leave to intervene as plaintiffs
in the proceeding.' Although the defendants pleaded a variety of defenses,
the court ruled that the only defenses common to all plaintiffs were those pleaded
under section 11(b) (3) of the Securities Act of 1933, and deferred judgment
on the propriety of the other asserted defenses until a later date. In an opinion
dealing solely with questions of law and fact which applied to every plaintiff,
the court held: in an action brought under section 11, reliance on the affirmations
of management concerning the accuracy of material facts presented in the regis-
tration statement, without a further attempt to verify those affirmations, is a
sufficient ground to bar company counsel who are directors of the corporation,
underwriters, and accountants from establishing the right to the defenses avail-
able to them under section 11(b) (3) (A) and (B). Escott v. BarChris Con-
struction Corporation, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The decision rendered by the court in Escott moved one popular newspaper
to term the case a "Legal Blockbuster."' The reason for that gush of journalistic
hyperbole lies in the interpretation of the requirements of section 11(b) (3)
by the court. Since the pleadings of both plaintiff and defendant relating to the
issue of liability were fit snugly within the four comers of the section, a brief
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement,
or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.
6 For a list of the named defendants in this action other than BarChris, see note 63 infra.
7 By May of 1963, eighteen plaintiffs had intervened without opposition. An additional
twenty five sought to intervene in May of 1964. The motion to intervene was denied by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, but that decision was
reversed and leave to intervene was granted to the petitioners. See Escott v. Barchris [sic]
Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S.
816 (1965). The balance of the intervenors were granted leave to intervene in accordance
with that decision. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8 In addition to the defenses of estoppel, waiver, and release, the defendants pleaded
the defenses contained in section 13, section 11(b)(3)(A),(B) and (C), and section 11(e).
Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 77m, is the limitation
of liabilities section of the act and provides in relevant part:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section [11]
unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the
omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reason-
able diligence .. .. In no event shall any such action be brought . ..more than
three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public ....
Subsection '(e) of section 11 was pleaded by each defendant with the exception of BarChris,
to whom as the issuer it was not available. It establishes the criteria for what amounts to a
defense based on lack of causation. It provides in relevant part:
That if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents
other than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from [the materially
misstated] part of the registration statement, with respect to which his liability is
asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of
or all such damages shall not be recoverable ...
Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) establishes the criteria for the maintenance of the affirmative
defense under section 11. For the relevant provisions of this section see text accompanying
notes 61, 62 infra.
9 The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
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discussion of its legislative history may be helpful in adding perspective to the
analysis of Escott which follows.'
The Securities Act of 1933 is primarily a disclosure statute." The philosophy
of the Act was embodied in the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his
message to Congress of March 29, 1933: "This proposal adds to the ancient rule
of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller."'
Despite the fact that there was virtually no argument concerning the need"
for federal action in the regulation of the securities markets, or concerning the
objectives of the Securities Act,' 4 the financial community was not unduly en-
thusiastic in its acceptance. This reluctance was primarily a result of the ap-
prehension felt over the civil liabilities provision in section 11.1 s Congress
demonstrated its awareness of the situation when it attached a rider' 6 to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,17 which tended to soften and clarify several
of the provisions of the section and those of other sections which related to it.'
10 For a personalized study of the legislative history of the Act from the standpoint of one
of its draftsmen, see Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 29 '(1959).
11 For an assessment of the role of disclosure in relation to the various aspects of securities
regulation, including the Securities Act of 1933, see Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Dis-
closure, 62 MicH. L. REV. 607 (1964).
12 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
13 The total dollar loss suffered by the investing public caused by investment in stocks
which proved worthless during the decade preceding passage of the Act has been estimated at
25 billion dollars. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1933, § 1 at 2, col. 1; H.R. RaP. No. 85, supra
note 12.
14 Edward N. Gadsby, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
stated that:
[T]he two principal objectives of the 1933 act were, first, to protect investors by
requiring adequate and accurate disclosure regarding securities distributed to the
public in interstate commerce or by use of the mail and, second, to outlaw fraud in
the sale of all securities whether or not newly issued. Gadsby, Historical Development
of the S.E.C.-the Government View, 28 GEo. WASH. L. RaV. 6, 9 (1959).
15 See, e.g., Freeman, A Private Practitioner's View of the Development of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 28 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 18 '(1959). The newly formed Securities
and Exchange Commission had to use a degree of salesmanship to convince big business that it
was comparatively safe to register securities under the Act.
As one of [the Security and Exchange Commission's] earliest tasks, the first
Chairman of the Commission, Joseph P. Kennedy, and its General Counsel, John J.
Burns, packed their suitcases like travelling salesmen, and went to visit the Bethlehem
Steel Company to try to persuade Bethlehem to file a registration statement for a
public bond issue instead of a private placement. They agreed to make special rules
to expedite the financing and made many other concessions to secure the first regis-
tration statement by a major company. Id.;
James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MicH. L. REV. 624, 661 (1934):
Unless some of the more drastic provisions of the Act are modified fundamental
changes are apt to develop in securities marketing. It is not inconceivable that much
of the underwriting may be done either by the less desirable bankers, of borderline
integrity, impecunious, or whose wives will be rich women . . . . It is not incon-
ceivable that public financing may have to be done through governmental agencies
such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. I do not consider this likely,
although it has been intimated by some who have been rather closely connected
with the Administration.
See also Ballantine, Amending the Federal Securities Act, 20 A.B.A.J. 85 (1934).
16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 206, 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
17 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78jj (1964).
18 The amendment did not have a direct effect on the outcome of the decision in Escott.
It was mentioned solely for its historical significance and will not be discussed here. For
analyses of the effects of the amendments on the original act see 3 Loss 1725-29; Hanna,
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CALIF. L. RaV. 1, 6-8 (1934).
[October, 1968]
CASE COMMENTS
The civil action developed by Congress in section 11 of the Securities Act as
amended by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is patterned after the common
law tort action of deceit. 9 However, the tort action was modified in three essen-
tial respects which serve to handsomely benefit the plaintiff in establishing liabil-
ity. These three modifications involve the privity, reliance, and scienter elements
of the original deceit action.
The dispensation of the traditional element of privity between the purchaser
of the securities and the seller was considered "the most striking innovation"
in the section.2" Any person who acquired the security issued pursuant to the
statement"' without knowledge of the misleading representations contained in it
may bring an action under section 11. To establish reliance under section 11 (a)
the plaintiff must prove only that he purchased the security issued pursuant to
the registration statement, unless the plaintiff
acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available to its
security holders an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve
months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement, [at
which time] the right of recovery is conditioned on proof that such person
acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration
statement or relying on the registration statement and not knowing of such
omission, but such reliance may be established without proof of the reading
of the registration state - by such person.22
Finally, the plaintiff in an action under the section is relieved of the
burden of establishing scienter. Instead, the burden of disproving the existence
of the element is placed on the defendant. The rationale behind the transposition
of the burden is that:
Unless responsibility is to involve merely paper liability it is necessary
to throw the burden of disproving responsibility for reprehensible acts of
omission or commission on those who purport to issue statements for the
public's reliance. The responsibility imposed is no more than nor less than
that of a trust. It is a responsibility that no honest banker and no honest
19 3 Loss 1683. For statements of the elements of the tort cause of action in deceit, see
W. PROSSER, HANI.DBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 700 (3d ed. 1964); 1 F. HARPER AND F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 528 (1956).
20 Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L. J. 227, 249 (1933).
21 This provision of the section has been a source of frustration to plaintiffs. See Fisch-
man v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), rev'd, 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951) (purchasers of common stock were not entitled to join with preferred stockholders in a
suit under section 11 where the registration statement pertained only to the issuance of pre-
ferred stock); Barnes v Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 269 '(2d
Cir. 1967) (two stockholders were denied permission to share in the settlement proceeds
following a section 11 action because they could not trace their shares to those issued under
the misleading registration statement); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F.
Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defendant's motion for summary judgment concerning suit brought
to enforce liability under section 11 granted, on basis that plaintiff had not purchased stocks
issued pursuant to registration statement, although the stocks purchased by plaintiff and those
covered by the statement were of the same class).
22 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1964). The
reason that this provision was included in the section was:
that in all likelihood the purchase and price of the security purchased after pub-
lication of such an earning statement will be predicated on that statement rather than
on the information disclosed upon registration. H.R. RaP. No. 1838, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 41 '(1934).
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businessman should seek to avoid or fear. To impose a lesser responsibility
would nullify the purpose of this legislation.23
The requirements which must be satisfied by a defendant in a section 11
action to successfully plead lack of scienter as a defense are contained in sub-
section (b). The issuer is the only defendant to whom the provisions of the
subsection are unavailable 2 The other defendants may establish lack of scienter
as a defense under the subsection by proving:
(1) that they took the steps required under subsection (b) (1) or (2) to dis-
avow any responsibility for the accuracy of the material presented in the
registration statement;2  or
(2) that if the misstatements in the registration statement were either state-
ments purportedly made by an official person or which purported to be
a copy of or extract from a public document, that they had no reasonable
grounds to believe and did not at the time the registration statement
became effective believe that the statements were materially misleading; 2
or
(3) in the case of a defendant considered an expert" by the court -that
either (a) that the part found to be materially misleading and at-
tributed to him was not in fact his statement or was not an accurate
representation of his work" or (b) if the statements or representations
were accurate, that he had made a reasonable investigation relative to
them and which gave him reasonable grounds to believe that they were
true, and, that at the time the registration statement became effective
he still held that belief ;29 or
(4) in the case of the defendants other than the expert, that (a) if the ma-
terial mistakes were contained in the non-expertised portion"0 of the
23 H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 12, at 9, 10.
24 The issuer is liable under section 11(a) (1) as a signer of the registration statement.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(4), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1964)
defines the term "issuer".
25 Securities Act of 1933 § II(b)(1) and (2), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
26 Id. § 11(b) (3) (D).
27 An expert, within the meaning of subsection (b), is
every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives
authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as
having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having pre-
pared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection with the
registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration statement,
report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by him ....
For an analysis of the liability of experts under section 11, see Douglas and Bates, The Fed-
eral Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171, 197-98 (1933).
28 Securities Act of 1933 § ll(b)'(3) (B) (ii), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k (1964).
29 Id. § 11(b) (3) (B) (i).
30 The term "non-expertised portion" is used in the interest of brevity. It means any
portion of the registration statement not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert,
not purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not pur-
porting to be made on the authority of a public official document or statement.
[October, 1968]
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registration statement, he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
grounds to believe and did at the time the statement became effective
believe that the statements were true and not materially misleading, and,
(b) that if the mistakes were in the part of the registration statement
which was the expert's work, or a copy or extract of the expert's work,
that he had no reasonable grounds to believe, and did not believe at
the effective date of the registration statement that the statements made
on the expert's authority were materially misleading."'
Despite the use of these three modifications of the deceit action by Congress
to enable the plaintiff to successfully plead his case under section 11, the number
of judicial decisions involving actions brought under the section is surprisingly
low. This situation prompted Professor Loss in his treatise published in 1961 to
characterize section 11 as "the bate noire that was going to stifle legitimate
financing - and which has produced two reported recoveries in almost twenty-
eight years."3" A number of reasons have been advanced in an attempt to ac-
count for the scarcity of reported actions: the high degree of care exercised by
the bar and the accounting profession in the preparation of registration state-
ments; the careful examination of the accuracy of materials contained in the
statements by the Securities and Exchange Commission; the cost of litigation;
and, probably to some extent, investor apathy.3
While these elements have no doubt aided in holding down the amount
of reported litigation, there has been a decided trend in this decade toward
greater use of section 11 by investors seeking to litigate. Professor Loss listed only
11 reported actions and two recoveries from 1933 to 196 l." He noted, however,
that the utilization of the class action device could give "investors with a mind
to litigate an easier row to hoe."35 Since Professor Loss made that observation
there have been at least six actions brought under section 11. Five of these
actions, including Escott,"8 resulted in agreement and compromise settlements,
while in the remaining one there was no adjudication of liability because the
31 Id. § Il(b)(3) (A), (C).
32 3 Loss 1721. For a listing of reported decisions involving section 11 actions from 1933
through 1960, see id. at 1688 n.11.
33 Id. at 1690-92. An additional factor which should be mentioned is the probability of
out-of-court settlements by an issuer with investors who appear to have well-founded claims.
The liability of an issuer under section 11 in the case of a material misrepresentation is virtual-
ly absolute if 1) the investor did not know of the misrepresentation at the time he purchased
the security, 2) the limitations section of the Act has not run, and 3) the causation defense of
section 11(e) (3) is inapplicable.
34 Id. at 1688 n.11.
35 Id. at 1692.
36 Barnes v. Osofsky, 254 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (agreement and compromise
settlement of $775,000 approved by court); Derdiarian v. Futterman Corp., 38 F.R.D. 178
(S.D.N.Y.) (agreement and compromise settlement estimated by counsel to be approximately
$2,200,000, approved by court); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
'(agreement and compromise settlement of $1,825,000 approved by court); Cherner v.
Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963) (agreement and compromise
settlement of $5,300,000 approved by court).
In Escott, a stipulation of settlement was entered into by all parties other than the trustee
in bankruptcy, and this stipulation was approved by the court. Letter from E. Michael
Bradley to John P. Freeman, August 9, 1968, on file with the NoTR DAME LAWYER.
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plaintiffs were barred on other grounds." It appears that Professor Loss was
extremely accurate in his appraisal, since only one'8 of the six cases was not a
class action brought under the provisions of Rule 23 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
While the relatively few decisions concerning section 11 had the effect, to a
certain extent, of allaying the apprehension of some that our economic system
might revert to a "barter economy,"3 9 it also had the direct effect of stunting
the growth of judicial interpretation of the section's key provisions. At the time
of the Act's passage it was realized that judicial interpretation of the section,
particularly subsection (b), would be necessary before the full impact of the
statute could be fully evaluated.4" No one, of course, knew how much time
would be required before the judiciary fully interpreted the provisions of the
section, although one estimate was advanced that it would take a decade for the
courts to complete the task."
Escott, as mentioned previously, is distinctly a section 11 action. In a sense
the case is precisely the type of suit envisioned by Congress when it drafted the
section and provided the defendants with the affirmative defenses contained in
subsection (b). But Escott, a typical section 11 action, is singularly atypical be-
cause in no reported case in the thirty-five year history of the Act has a court
been called upon to interpret the requirements of the "due diligence defenses"
of subsection (b). Essentially, Escott involved first a judgment by the court that
the misstatements contained in the prospectus were materially misleading, 2 and
then an appraisal of the right of each defendant to the defenses of subsection
(b) .
I. The Material Misstatements
In determining whether the untrue statements of fact or misleading omis-
sions contained in the registration statement were material, the court adopted the
standard of materiality developed in Charles A. Howard,4 4 which ruled that a
material fact is a "fact which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed would
have deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing
the securities in question."4 The court, after a detailed investigation of the
errors claimed by plaintiffs to be material, concluded that the registration state-
37 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 257 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(defendant's motion for summary judgment granted because plaintiff had not purchased stocks
issued pursuant to the registration statement).
38 Id.
39 See James, supra note 15; Ballantine, supra note 15.
40 See, e.g., Teass, Duty of Directors and Others as Prescribed by Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 20 VA. L. REy. 818 '(1934).
There will no doubt grow up a body of law to guide directors, officers, experts,
etc., in the degree of care they must exercise to avoid liability but in the interval
they should exercise extreme care and caution to secure freedom from liability, and
record for purposes of refreshing their memories at least a brief digest of the investi-
gations made and grounds of their belief. Id. at 845.
41 This estimate was made by Mr. Justice Douglas, then a Professor of Law at Yale
University, and George C. Bates. Douglas and Bates, supra note 27, at 173.
42 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 655-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43 Id. at 682-703.
44 1 S.E.C. 6 '(1934).
45 Id. at 8.
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ment filed by BarChris which became effective on May 16, 1961, misstated
BarChris's true financial position within the meaning of section 11(a) in eight
different respects: 40
(1) current assets were overstated by approximately $600,000 in BarChris's
December 31, 1960, balance sheet." The working capital ratio,4 orig-
inally stated at 1.9 to 1, which the court considered "bad enough" 9 was,
with the overstatement of current assets eliminated, 1.6 to 1.50
(2) Contingent liabilities as of April 30, 1961, were understated by more
than $600,000.51
(3) Sales for the quarter ended March 31, 1961, were overstated by more
than $500,000, with a corresponding overstatement of gross profits of
$230,000.-
(4) Orders on hand were overstated as of March 31, 1961, by $4,490,000.2
(5) Page 10 of the prospectus contained in the registration statement rep-
resented that all loans made by the officers of BarChris to the corpora-
tion had been repaid. In reality, at the time the registration statement
became effective, loans made by three of BarChris's officers to the corpora-
tion aggregating over $380,000 were outstanding and unpaid. 4
(6) The company failed to make adequate disclosure of the fact that several
of its customers were in arrears in meeting their payments to BarChris's
chief factor, Talcott, and that BarChris was contingently liable in case
of customer defaults in the sum of over $1,350,000.'5
(7) On page 2 of the prospectus the company represented that the pro-
ceeds of the debenture sale would be used to finance construction of a
new plant, develop a new equipment line, cover a loan to a wholly
owned subsidiary, and to expand its business generally. Actually, the
officers of the corporation intended to use over $1,000,000 of the pro-
ceeds to pay its creditors, and an additional $120,000 to make a loan
to another company."
(8) The section of the prospectus which described BarChris's business failed
46 The existence of a single material misstatement in a registration statement at the date
it becomes effective is a sufficient basis for liability under the section. Securities Act of 1933
§ 11(a), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
47 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
48 The working capital ratio, or "current ratio," is obtained by dividing the total dollar
value of current assets by the total dollar value of current liabilities. This ratio indicates a
corporation's ability to pay all current liabilities if current assets were converted to cash in
the normal operating cycle of the business. For an analysis of the various ratios that may be
used in determining the quality and value of a security, see D. BFLLEMORE, INVESTMENTS
PRINCIPLES PRACTICES AND ANALYSES 629-57 (2d ed. 1962).
49 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682 "(S.D.N.Y. 1968). A current
ratio of 2:1 generally is considered to be satisfactory, but the acceptability of a ratio should
also be judged according to averages in the particular industry. J. BoG;EN, FINANCIAL HAND-
nOOxC 8"32 (4th ed. 1964).
50 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
51 Id. at 667.
52 Id. at 668.
53 Id. at 668-71.
54 Id. at 671-73.
55 Id. at 676-78, 680.
56 Id. at 673-76.
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to state that BarChris, in addition to building, equipping, and repairing
bowling alleys, was also in the business of operating them."
II. The Section 11(b) (3) Defenses
Since the plaintiffs had successfully sustained the burden of establishing a
prima facie case against the defendants, the burden of pleading and proving the
right to the affirmative defenses of section 11(b) (3) shifted to the defendants.5 8
BarChris, who as the issuer, was barred from establishing the defenses of section
11 (b) (3)," was the only defendant which did not plead the affirmative defenses
contained therein. With the exception of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. -
determined by the court to be the "expert" within the meaning of the subsection"0
- each of the defendants relied on the provisions of subsections (b) (3) (A)
and (b) (3) (C). These provide, in relevant part, that no person other than the
issuer shall be liable under the provisions of section 11 if he sustains the burden
of proving
(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not
purporting to be made on the authority of an expert . . . he had, after
reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe,
at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that
the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading . . . and (C) as regards any part
of the registration statement purporting to be made on the authority of
an expert (other than himself) . . . he had no reasonable ground to believe
and did not believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that there was
an omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces-
sary to make the statement therein not misleading, or that such part of the
registration statement did not fairly represent the statement of the expert
or was not a fair copy of or extract from the report or valuation of the
expert .... 61
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. pleaded the due diligence defense for an expert
available under section 11(b) (3) (B). That subsection, in relevant part, pro-
vides, that an expert will not be held liable under section 11 if he sustains the
burden of proving that
as regards any part of the registration statement purporting to be made
upon his authority as an expert . . . he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the
registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were
true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be
57 Id. at 678.
58 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
59 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
60 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
61 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3)'(A),(C), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1964).
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stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading ....
In all, nineteen defendants pleaded the due diligence defenses of section
11 (b) (3).63 To attempt to present a searching analysis of the degree of care
exercised by each defendant and the court's view with respect thereto is beyond
the scope of this comment. On the other hand, to merely indulge in broad
generalizations concerning the degree of due diligence exercised by the defendants
as a whole would result in, at best, a too casual appraisal of the guidelines
established by the court relative to the affirmative defenses in subsection (b) (3),
and would defeat the intent of this discussion. Therefore, in the competing
interests of clarity and brevity, this study will consider individually the extent
to which the various classes of defendants sustained the burden of successfully
pleading their affirmative defenses. These classes are categorized according to
the similarities noted by the court concerning the degree of care exercised by
them and demanded by the statute.
A. The Signers of the Registration Statement
1. Officers of the Corporation
Vitolo was the President, Russo, the Executive Vice-President, Pugliese,
the Vice-President, Kircher, the Treasurer, and Birnbaur, the Secretary of
BarChris.6 4 Each of them, the court held, had knowledge of the misleading
character of at least some of the material misstatements contained in the pros-
pectus. Kircher and Russo were held by the court to have known all the relevant
facts regarding the actual state of BarChris's financial position at the time the
registration statement became effective. Birnbaum, Vitolo, and Pugliese could
not, it was judged, have believed that the registration statement was wholly true
because of their knowledge and appreciation of BarChris's financial problems
which were not disclosed in the registration statement." What is significant is
that even if one (or, for that matter, all) of BarChris's officers had absolutely no
knowledge or reason to know that there were any material misstatements in the
registration statement, he still would not have been able to avoid liability. Mere
lack of culpability is not a defense under section 11. This is so because one of the
chief prerequisites to the successful maintenance of a subsection (b) (3) (A)
defense is proof of a reasonable investigation of the non-expertised portion of
62 Id. § 11(b) (3) (B).
63 The defendants, and the basis of their liability under the section, were: Trilling,
signer of the registration statement [section 11 (a) (1); Vitolo, Russo, Pugliese, Kircher, Birn-
baum, Auslander, Rose, and Grant, signers of the registration statement and directors of
BarChris [section 11'(a)(1),(2)]; Coleman, signer of the registration statement, director
of BarChris, and underwriter [section 11(a)(1),(2),(5)]; Drexel & Co., Hemphill, Noyes &
Co., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Salomon Brothers & Hutzler, Peter Morgan & Co.,
Blair & Co. and G. H. Walker & Co., underwriters of the debentures [section 11(a)(5)];
and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., BarChris's auditors [section 11(a) (4)]. All failed to sus-
tain the burden of proof required by section 1r(b). Birnbaum, Auslander, Rose, Grant,
Coleman, and the underwriters successfully pleaded section 11(b) (3) (C), but failed to meet
the requirements of section 11 (b) (3) (A).
64 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
65 Id. at 684-87.
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the registration statement,68 and no investigation was conducted by any of the
defendants. The court indicated that had an investigation been made, it could
not have afforded the defendants reasonable grounds to believe the prospectus
contained no material misstatements because they had actual knowledge of the
true state of BarChris's financial affairs." However, the complete absence of any
investigation was in itself sufficient grounds to deny the defense of due diligence
to the officers.
2. Trilling
Trilling was BarChris's controller and was neither a director nor officer of
BarChris. He was, the court noted, actually a comparatively minor figure in
BarChris's corporate scheme. The plaintiff's sole basis for alleging that Trilling
was liable was the fact that he signed the statement, and as a signer he was
required to exercise due diligence in relation to the facts presented therein. As
was the case with the officers, Trilling failed to make an investigation of the
accuracy of the statements contained in the registration statement. Consequently,
he could not establish the initial prerequisite of the due diligence defense con-
tained in subsection (b) (3) (A).
3. The Outside Directors"
i. Auslander and Rose
Auslander and Rose became directors of the corporation on April 17, 1961,
less than one month before the effective date of the registration statement. The
court noted that both were informed that they stood to reap indirect benefits of a
monetary nature by accepting directorships. Vitolo told Auslander, the Chairman
of the Board of a bank, that BarChris would deposit $1,000,000 of the proceeds
from the debenture sale in his bank,7" and Kircher intimated to Rose, a
civil engineer, that BarChris might in the future have need for his professional
services. 1 Before becoming directors, both had made independent inquiries into
the financial position of the company and had read copies of BarChris's annual
report for 1960.2 At the board of directors meeting held on May 15, 1961, the
day before the registration statement became effective, both signed the signature
sheet for the registration statement. The registration statement itself in its final
form was not presented for inspection at that meeting, and apparently neither had
read it before it became effective on the following day.7" At the meeting Rose
66 See text accompanying note 61, supra.
67 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 684-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68 Id. at 686.
69 An outside director for the purpose of this discussion means one who was not an officer
of the corporation.
70 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 687 "(S.D.N.Y. 1968). In reality
the amount actually deposited was $300,000, $138,000 of which was soon withdrawn. Id.
at n.18.
71 Id. at 689.
72 Id. at 687, 689.
73 Id. The court noted that Rose had read the initial version of the statement for roughly
ten minutes, and that Auslander had glanced briefly at the statement filed on May 11, 1961.
Id. at 688, 689.
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inquired if the information contained in the registration statement was correct
and Vitolo and Russo stated before the group that it was.7'
The question presented to the court concerning the due diligence defenses
pleaded by Auslander and Rose was whether, because of their comparatively
short tenure on the board of directors during which they had relatively little
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the company's affairs," the in-
quiries made by them before they became directors and their reliance on the
representations of the two officers of the company constituted a reasonable in-
vestigation within the meaning of the statute. The court first noted that the
standards of investigation demanded by section 11(b) (3) (A) had never been
judicially interpreted. The court did not hold that no investigation had been
made by Auslander and Rose as it did in the case of the officers. However, it
concluded that the investigation was insufficient and made it quite clear that a
director, no matter how new he may be, who relies solely on management's rep-
resentations when management is a "comparative stranger," has not made the
reasonable investigation required by section 11 (b) (3) (A)."'
ii. Grant
Grant became a director of the corporation in October, 1960. He was an
attorney and his firm was counsel to BarChris in matters which pertained to
securities registration statements. He had taken initial responsibility in the prep-
aration of the debenture registration statement. The fact that Grant was the
director most intimately connected with the preparation of the registration state-
ment was crucial to the court's analysis of the reasonableness of his investigation.
The court observed that
in considering Grant's due diligence defenses, the unique position which
he occupied cannot be disregarded. As the director most directly con-
cerned with writing the registration statement and assuring its accuracy,
more was required of him in the way of a .reasonable investigation than
could fairly be expected of a director who had no connection with this
work.77 (Emphasis added.)
The standard for determining reasonableness of investigation and reasonable
grounds for belief within the meaning of section 11(b) (3) is defined in section
11(c) as "that required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property." 78 The standard used in that subsection is substantially the standard
for a fiduciary defined in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, with the exception
that the Restatement provides that "if the trustee has or procures his appoint-
ment as trustee by representing that he has greater skill than that man of ordi-
nary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill."" The court in essence
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 688.
77 Id. at 690.
78 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(c), 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
79 RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TRuSTS § 174 (1959).
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adopted this view in considering Grant's defense, and thereby judicially modified
the requirements of section 11 (c).
Regarding the standard of care demanded by the statute, Grant contended
that if the court held he did not make a reasonable investigation, it would,
practically speaking, be equivalent to holding that a lawyer must conduct an
independent audit of the material contained in the registration statement. To
the court, this was not a "realistic statement of the issue."'8 The question, in
the court's opinion, was whether he made a reasonable effort to detect errors
which could have been discovered without an audit."' The court then recounted
a series of omissions in Grant's investigation which resulted in his failure to un-
cover any of the material discrepancies. 2 Grant failed to establish his due dili-
gence defense because,
[a]fter making all due allowances for the fact that Bar Chris's [sic] officers
misled him, there [were] too many instances in which [he] failed to
make an inquiry which he could have easily made which, if pursued, would
have put him on his guard.8 3
One such inquiry which Grant failed to make illustrates particularly well
the court's interpretation of the type of investigation he could have used to check
matters "easily verifiable" which "would have put him on his guard." On page
10 of the prospectus it was stated that Grant's law firm had received, as of the
effective date of the statement (May 16, 1961), fees which totaled $13,000.
Grant had taken the word of Kircher, BarChris's Treasurer, that this bill had
been paid. In reality, the law firm had received less than $5,000, and the check
for the balance of that figure was not received until shortly before June 1, 1961.
BarChris had been holding delivery of checks already drawn and signed because
of the lack of sufficient funds to pay them until the proceeds from the debenture
issue were received. The court observed that
[i]n approving this erroneous statement in the prospectus, [Grant] did
not consult his own bookkeeper to ascertain whether it was correct.... If
he had inquired and found this representation was untrue, this discovery
might well have led him to a realization of the true state of BarChris's
finances in May, 1961.84
The court, with one exception, evaluated Grant's investigation in terms of
what Grant did or failed to do in relation to the material misstatements con-
tained in the registration statement. The lone exception involved the misstate-
ment of the fees paid to Grant's firm, which is discussed above. 5 The sole reason
the court was required to pass upon the adequacy of Grant's investigation was
that the plaintiffs successfully proved that the registration statement was ma-
80 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 690-92.
83 Id. at 692.
84 Id.
85 BarChris was not required to disclose the fees paid in the prospectus, but Grant chose
to do so "in the spirit of complete disclosure." Memorandum on Behalf of Defendant Philip
R. Grant at 87, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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terially misleading. The fact that the misleading statements existed is irrefutable
evidence that none of the defendants who investigated the validity of the regis-
tration statement succeeded in discovering them. The court's proposition - that
the reasonableness of Grant's investigation depended on whether he took all the
steps that he could have taken to lead him to a discovery of the errors -, seems
to break down if Grant had indeed taken the steps suggested by the court. In
such a case he would not only have made a reasonable investigation; he would
have uncovered all the mistakes in the unexpertised portion of the registration
statement. In short, to determine the reasonableness of the investigation required
of a defendant by analyzing solely whether steps which would have led to the
discovery of the errors were taken is, in view of the fact that the errors were
not discovered, to hold that the defendant cannot establish a defense. The more
logical and reasonable method of evaluation - which, hopefully, courts faced
with the same determination in succeeding cases will follow - would be to
examine the overall scope of the investigation. The court in Escott chose to apply
the quintessence of hindsight to its examination of Grant's investigation, and
held him liable for his omissions.
iii. Coleman
Coleman, like Auslander and Rose, became a director of BarChris on
April 17, 1961. He was a partner in the underwriting firm of Drexel & Co.,
and was therefore subject to liability under section 11(a) as a signer of the
registration statement, a director, and also as an underwriter. Technically it
was possible for Coleman to avoid liability under the subsection as a signer and
director, but still to be held liable as an underwriter. The court noted the three
bases for Coleman's liability, but did not explicitly disclose the capacity or
capacities in which it held him liable.
The court treated the degree of care exercised by Coleman concurrently
with its discussion of the underwriters. Regarding the sufficiency of Coleman's
investigation, the court stated:
The same conclusions [which the court had reached in determining that
the underwriters failed to exercise due diligence] must apply to Coleman
.... He made no investigation after he became a director. When it came
to verification, he relied upon his counsel to do it for him. Since counsel
failed to do it, Coleman is bound by that failure. Consequently, in his case
also, he has not established his due diligence defense .... 86
The "counsel" referred to by the court were the counsel which made the investi-
gation for Drexel & Co. In a sense, then, the court equated the insufficiency of
Coleman's investigation with that of the investigation made on behalf of the
underwriters. The question thus arises whether the court was holding that the
standards of reasonableness required of underwriters and directors are identical,
or rather that Coleman as an underwriter failed to establish his affirmative
defense because that defense did not measure up to the standard required of
an underwriter.
86 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 '(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Because of the character of the legal argument presented by the under-
writers, the exact basis for Coleman's liability becomes crucial. The underwriters,
as had the director Grant, relied to a great extent on the representation of
management that the material contained in the registration statement was cor-
rect. The issue regarding the adequacy of the underwriter's investigation was,
in the court's words: "[I]s it sufficient to ask questions, to obtain answers which,
if true, would be thought satisfactory, and let it go at that, without seeking to
ascertain from the records whether the answers in fact are true and complete?""7
The court noted that such reliance on affirmations made by management was
insufficient to establish a defense in Grant's case, and addressed itself to a de-
termination of whether underwriters should be entitled to a different standard
of care.
The legal argument advanced by the underwriters was this: under New
York law a director is entitled to rely on information furnished him by the
management of the corporation without making an investigation of its accu-
racy; since section 11 requires the same standards of due diligence of under-
writers as it does of directors, underwriters should also be entitled to rely on
management's word regarding the accuracy of the information furnished.
The court noted that the authority relied on by the underwriters- the
New York Supreme Court case of Litwin v. Allenes - was not binding on federal
courts in their interpretation of the Securities Act. However, the underwriters'
argument was not rejected for that reason. Instead, the court attacked the anal-
ogy used to equate the position of director with that of underwriter:
In my opinion the two situations are not analogous. An underwriter
has not put the company's officers "into a position of trust for the express
purpose of attending to details of management."[P9] The underwriters did
not select them. In a sense, the positions of the underwriter and the com-
pany's officers are adverse. It is not unlikely that statements made by
company officers to an underwriter may be self-serving. They may be
unduly enthusiastic. As in this case, they may, on occasion, be deliberately
false.8 0
The court then proceeded to hold that since the underwriter's counsel had failed
to make an adequate investigation (i.e., had failed to adequately verify the data
presented by management), the underwriters were bound by that failure.
In its analysis of the analogy offered by the underwriters, the court impliedly
recognized a difference between the standard of investigation required of a
director and that required of an underwriter. The court left the impression
that a director is entitled to rely to some extent on management's affirmations.
Grant was not entitled to rely on management's representations, but the court
87 Id. at 696.
88 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). In this case, a group of directors were held not to
have been negligent in connection with certain loans made by Guarantee Trust Company
which ultimately resulted in a loss of $9,000,000. The court stated that "[d]irectors have a
right in forming their conclusions to rely upon information furnished and conclusions ex-
pressed by the management." Id. at 719.
89 The court here was quoting dicta from Dovey v. Corey, [1901], App. Cas. 477, 486,
which was cited in Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 719 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
90 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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also pointed out that "more was required of him '"9 since he prepared the state-
ment. Auslander and Rose, who acted "in sole reliance upon representations
of persons who [were] comparative strangers and upon general information
which [did] not purport to cover the particular case, ' '9 were unable to estab-
lish their due diligence defenses. The key word in their case, however, was
"sole". Since the court seemed to infer that a director may rely on management
to some degree, it therefore appears that if they had conducted at least some
independent research pertinent to the registration statement they may have
been successful in establishing the defense.
In Coleman's case, the court was presented with the perfect occasion to
delineate precisely the exact scope of a director's duty as contrasted with the
duty of an underwriter. This opportunity was bypassed, for it appears that the
adequacy of the investigation made by Coleman's counsel was judged by the
standards established by the court for underwriters, and that the basis for Cole-
man's liability was thus failure of his duty as an underwriter. Nevertheless,
because of the inexactness of the court's language, the possibility that Coleman
was held liable in his capacity as director cannot be completely ruled out. If
such were the case, then the court did not just destroy the analogy presented
by the underwriters, but it also rejected the proposition that a director need not
independently verify information presented by management. It is surprising that
a court which was aware that it was setting standards to be applied or at least
considered in future cas& would fail to make such a distinction.
B. The Underwriters
Drexel & Co. was the lead underwriter and conducted the investigation
of BarChris both for itself and for the other underwriters named as defendants.94
The court's analysis of the investigation made by Drexel was discussed in rela-
tion to Coleman, and will not be reviewed here. The court's determination that
the investigation conducted by Drexel's counsel was not sufficient bound Drexel
and the other underwriters who relied on Drexel to make the investigation for
them. 5 Although not pointed out by the court, it is significant to note that
Drexel's investigation was made with substantially the same degree of care as
that exercised by the underwriting profession in general. Professor Loss remarked
that:
In view of the paucity of § 11 actions, there is little case law on the
several defenses. In practice, the principal underwriters usually arrange
sometime during the waiting period a "due diligence meeting" attended by
91 Id. at 690.
92 Id. at 688.
93 With respect to Grant, the court stated: "In my opinion, this finding on the evidence
of this case does not establish an unreasonably high standard for company counsel who are
also directors." Id. at 692.
94 Hemphill, Noyes & Co.; Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis; Salomon Brothers & Hutzler;
Peter Morgan & Company; Blair & Co.; G. H. Walker & Co.; and Ira Haupt & Co. The
action was severed as against Ira Haupt & Co., which went bankrupt prior to the date of the
opinion.
95 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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representatives of the issuer, its counsel, the underwriters and their counsel,
the accountant, and any other experts. Everybody is thus afforded the
opportunity to exercise "due diligence" by asking questions. Nobody knows
how valuable a safeguard this is. But it seems advisable, in the present
state of the law and in view of the potentially grave liabilities under § 11,
to do something of this sort in a serious manner rather than perfunctory.96
The opinion of the court mentioned three meetings held in March of 1961
that were attended by representatives of the underwriters and BarChris. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co. was represented at one of these meetings.9 7 The court
also noted that several other meetings of this nature were held.98 Yet because
of the ruling in Escott that an underwriter must go behind and beyond the
representations of the company's officers in an attempt to verify the accuracy
of management's statements, this and other methods of investigation used by
the underwriting profession as a whole are, no doubt, undergoing serious re-
evaluation and revision."
C. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
The affirmative defense available to and pleaded by Peat, Marwick as the
expert within the meaning of subsection (b) was section 11(b) (3) (B). °0 The
question which the court had to decide was
[W]hether [at the date the registration became effective] Peat, Marwick,
after reasonable investigation, had reasonable ground to believe and did
believe that the 1960 figures [certified by Peat, Marwick] were true and
that no material fact had been omitted from the registration statement
which should have been included in order to make the 1960 figures not
misleading.' 0 '
In its analysis of Peat, Marwick's audit of BarChris for the year ended December
31, 1960, and subsequent S-1 review, the court stated that it was concerned only
with the investigation as it related to the errors which the court considered
material. 2 The standard by which the accounting firm was measured supposedly
reflected generally recognized principles of the profession. On this basis, the
investigation was held insufficient. The court observed that the Peat, Marwick
accountant who conducted the S-1 review did not fully complete the steps re-
quired in the firm's own written program for the review, and, most importantly,
that "he was too easily satisfied with glib answers"'0 s to the inquiries he made
of management.
96 3 Loss 1730-31.
97 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
98 Id. at 694.
99 For a list of the steps taken in the performance of a "due diligence" investigation by
one underwriting firm when it acts as managing underwriter of an issue for a company making
its initial offering of common stock, see Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 513
(1963).
100 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
101 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
102 Id. at 699.
103 Id. at 703.
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III. Conclusion
In judging the availability of the due diligence defenses to the defendants,
the Escott court was required to make two basic determinations. The first
related to the standard of care required of the defendants, and the second to
an evaluation of the degree to which the defendants succeeded in fulfilling that
standard of care. The guidelines promulgated by the Escott court regarding
the degree of diligence demanded of the different defendants varied, as the
House Committee which discussed the Securities Act felt it should, "with the
importance of their place in the scheme of distributions and with the degree
of protection the public has a right to expect."1 ° The accounting firm, Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., was held to the standard of care practiced in the
accounting profession. Grant, a director, was held to a greater standard of
care than would have been the case had he not been involved in the preparation
of the registration statement. The court also implied that the degree of care
required of underwriters was greater than that of directors, other than those in
a position similar to that of Grant. The court made it clear that, in the case
of experts, underwriters and company counsel associated with the preparation
of the registration statement, more is required to establish the reasonable investi-
gation demanded by the statute than acceptance of management's affirmations
regarding the accuracy of the materials presented in the statement. Although
the court held that Auslander and Rose were also not entitled to rely on the
representations made by the officers, the position can be taken that the court
did not read the statute to bar at least partial reliance by directors on informa-
tion prepared and supplied by management. This interpretation is based on
the court's implied acceptance of Litwin v. Allen,' and on the fact that the
court considered that, in relying on Vitolo and Russo, Auslander and Rose
placed their faith in the statements of "comparative strangers."'"" Because of
the uniqueness of Auslander and Rose's position as newly elected directors, a
generalization concerning the standard of care required of a director, based on
the court's treatment of them, would be founded on what must be regarded as
an uncertainty. Until additional judicial interpretation is forthcoming, the
investigative standard required of a director under section 11 (b) (3) (A) must
be considered an open question.
The criterion used by the court in its determination of whether the investi-
gative standards of reasonableness demanded by subsection (b) (3) were met
by the underwriters, accountants, and lawyers was based primarily on a study
of the steps which the defendants might have taken to discover the ,errors con-
tained in the registration statement. For example, in relation to the misstatement
in the prospectus that all loans by officers to BarChris had been repaid, the
court observed that "Grant should have investigated further,"'0 7 that the under-
writer's counsel "made no inquiry after March,"' 0 8 and that Peat, Marwick's
104 H.R. PUp. No. 85, supra note 12, at 9.
105 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
106 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688 '(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
107 Id. at 691.
108 Id. at 695.
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senior accountant in charge of the S-1 review "did not know"'" of the situation.
In reality it was not until the spring of 1966, more than three years after the
suit was brought, that plaintiff's counsel "despite all their [independent] audit-
ing procedures and investigative expertise"'' discovered the error.
By holding that the defendants failed to make the reasonable investiga-
tion which a prudent man in the management of his own property would have
made, the Escott court expressed the opinion that, had the defendants conducted
a reasonable investigation, they would have discovered at least some of the
material misstatements. The court recognized that each case is unique, and that
the criteria used by one court in evaluating investigative techniques would not
be binding on courts faced with the same determination in later cases. Hope-
fully such subsequent courts will make a determination of reasonableness based
on the overall scope of investigation made by the defendant and not solely on
what he might have done, based on hindsight, to discover the errors. As the
Supreme Court stated in United States v. American Bell Telephone Company: 1
"But a wisdom born after the event is the cheapest wisdom of all. Anybody
could have discovered America after 1492." 112
At the time of its enactment it was recognized that while the civil liabilities
provisions of the Securities Act were primarily remedial in nature, they also
operated in terrorem,.s and exercised coercive pressure on those engaged in the
issuance of securities to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Act. Over
a third of a century has since passed, and if, as plaintiff has suggested, the
passage of years has caused the in terrorem provisions of the Act to blur,"4
Escott has served well to remind the financial community of its fundamental
obligations to the investing public." 5
John P. Freeman
CIVIL RIGHTS - PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS - AMUSEMENT PARK Is A
PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION AS DEFINED IN SECTIONS 201 (B) (3) AND
201 (c) (3) OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. - Amusement Enterprises,
Inc. is a Louisiana corporation which operates a small amusement park in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, under the trade name "Fun Fair Park." On its two and three-
quarters acres of land, Fun Fair has eleven permanently fixed mechanical "kiddie
rides" and an ice skating rink which is operated only during the winter. In
conjunction with the amusement facilities, Fun Fair operates a concession stand
which offers soft drinks and prepared foods for customers' refreshment. On about
109 Id. at 702.
110 Memorandum on Behalf of Defendant Philip R. Grant at 5, Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
111 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
112 Id. at 261.
113 See Douglas and Bates, supra note 27, at 173; Shulman, supra note 20, at 227. See also
Rodell, Regulation of Securities by the Federal Trade Commission, 43 YALE L. J. 272, 273
(1933).
114 Memorandum of Plaintiffs to Trial Court at 14, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
115 For a view of the significance which members of the financial community attach to the
court's decision in the instant case, see The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 1, col. 6.
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March 1, 1965, Mrs. Patricia Miller, a Negro, took her two minor children to
the park to ice skate. They were told by the manager that Fun Fair did not
"serve colored," in accordance with Fun Fair's policy of refusing Negroes access
to all the park's facilities, including the concession stand and skating rink. Mrs.
Miller and her children subsequently brought suit for an injunction in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, basing their action
on sections 201(b) (3) and 201(c) (3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The
district court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
action on the merits, holding that Fun Fair was not a "place of entertainment"
within the meaning of section 201 (b) (3) and that its operations did not "affect
commerce" according to the criterion of section 201 (c) (3).2 Appeal was taken
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed by a
two to one decision on September 6, 1967.' A petition for rehearing en banc
was granted. On April 8, 1968, the Fifth Circuit reversed itself, and, over the
dissent of three judges, held: an amusement park is a place of public accommoda-
tion within the meaning of sections 201(b)(3) and 201(c) (3) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th
Cir. 1968).
The issue in Miller had been squarely put in the district court: did the
coverage of sections 201(b) (3) and 201(c) (3) extend to Fun Fair? This was
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 78 Stat. 243-44, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964) provides
in part:
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of
public accommodation within the meaning of this title if its operations affect com-
merce, or if discrimination or segregation by it is supported by State action:
'(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging
to transient guests... ;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises ... ;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii)
within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establish-
ment, and '(B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered estab-
lishment.
(c) The operations of an establishment affect commerce within the meaning
of this subchapter if '(1) it is one of the establishments described in paragraph (1)
of subsection (b) of this section; (2) in the case of an establishment described in
paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate
travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other
products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment
described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this section, it customarily presents
films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment
which move in commerce; and (4) in the case of an establishment described in
paragraph '(4) of subsection (b) of this section, it is physically located within the
premises of, or there is physically located within its premises, an establishment the
operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of this subsection. . . .
2 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. La. 1966), aff'd,
391 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on rehearing, 394 F.2d 342 (1968).
3 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 391 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1967).
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accomplished by a stipulation of counsel which effectively excluded relief based
on the segregated operations of the concession stand."
The district court, in deciding whether Fun Fair was included in the lan-
guage "other place of . . . entertainment," applied the rule of statutory con-
struction known as ejusdem generis.5 Reasoning that since all the specific
establishments enumerated in section 201 (b) (3) "are the kind that furnish en-
tertainment to spectators as distinguished from participants," the court held that
any establishment to be included in the phrase "other place of ... entertainment"
must be of a class which offers "spectator" rather than "participative" amuse-
ment.' On appeal this rationale was accepted and supported by the authority of
Robertson v. Johnston' and Kyles v. Paul.' In the latter case, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas had said:
The statutory phrase "other place of exhibition or entertainment" must
refer to establishments similar to those expressly mentioned. When one con-
siders the exhibitions and entertainment offered by motion picture houses,
theatres, concert halls, sports arenas, and stadiums, it is clear at once that
basically patrons of such establishments are edified, entertained, thrilled,
or amused in their capacity of spectators or listeners; their physical partici-
pation in what is being offered to them is either nonexistent or minimal;
their role is fundamentally passive.'
To decide whether the operations of Fun Fair "affect commerce" within
the definition of section 201(c) (3), the district court in Miller relied upon two
arguments. First it reasoned that the rule ejusdem generis, applied to section
201(c) (3), would dictate that "sources of entertainment" be limited to those
used "for [the entertainment of] spectators and not participants."'" Then it
4 It is * * * stipulated by and between counsel that the plaintiff herein is making
no claim that the defendant, in the operation of the concession stands wherein
refreshments are allegedly served on a discriminatory basis, is operating his
facilities in violation of either Sec. 201(b) (2), Sec. 201(c) (2), Sec. 201(b) (4),
or Sec. 201(c) (4) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiff's sole contention in
this suit being that the defendant is operating his place of entertainment in violation
of Sec. 201(b) (3) and Sec. 201'(c) (3) of the Act. It was further stipulated that the
reference in the stipulated facts to the operation of the concession stands is merely
to show the total operation of the defendant's facility and not to allege or show a
violation of Sec. 201(b)(2), 201(c)(2), 201(b)'(4), or 201(c)(4) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 346
(5th Cir. 1968).
5 "Of the same kind, class, or nature." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1951).
6 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523, 525-26 (E.D. La. 1966).
7 249 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La. 1966). In Robertson a nightclub was found to be a
"place of . . . entertainment" within section 201(b)(3) by reason of its presentation of a
band. In its decision the court stated:
Any determination of the scope of the general phrase "other place of exhibition
or entertainment" must be guided by the interpretive principle ejusdem generis:
when specific terms in a statute are followed by general terms, the general terms are
limited to matters similar to, or of the same general kind or class as, those specified.
But the rule does not require that the general provisions be limited in scope to the
identical things specifically named; rather, the purpose of this aid to construction
is to prevent the general words from extending the operation of the statute into
a field not really intended. Thus "place of entertainment" is not to be construed
to mean "place of enjoyment", but rather must be limited at least to "place where
performances are presented." Id. at 622. (Footnotes omitted.)
8 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
9 Id. at 419.
10 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523, 527 (E.D. La. 1966).
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observed a distinction between that which "moves" in commerce and that which
"has moved" in commerce. Since the mechanical rides which Fun Fair main-
tained were not "sources of entertainment" until they had become permanently
fixed to the land and no longer moved anywhere, the court held that these de-
vices were not "source[s] of entertainment which move in commerce."1
The approach of the majority on rehearing was trilogistic. The previous
decision was reversed on the grounds that: 1) granting the applicability of
ejusdem generis to both sections of the statute, Fun Fair was nonetheless included
within the literal terms of sections 201(b)(3) and 201(c) (3) ;" 2) ejusdem
generis should not be applied to limit the coverage of the words "other place
of... entertainment" because to do so would be contrary to the obvious purpose
of the legislature; 3 and 3) the operations of Fun Fair "affect commerce" within
the meaning of section 201 (c) (3).'4
The first of these arguments purports to circumvent the "spectator-par-
ticipant" dichotomy by asserting that Fun Fair does indeed present an exhibition
for spectators. As the court said:
The amusement park presents a performance of small children riding on
various mechanical "kiddie" rides plus a performance of ice skating. It is
obvious to us that many of the people who assemble at the park come
there to be entertained 'by watching others, particularly their own children,
participate in the activities available.'5 (Emphasis added.)
Apparently the germ of this rationale was planted by a somewhat obscure foot-
note in appellant's brief on rehearing, since the argument had not been pre-
viously advanced in the Miller case or in any case cited by the court or counsel.
The footnote contained the following clause: "[S]urely [amusement parks] are
a type of spectacle, and the customers' enjoyment does not depend solely on their
actual participation in the available activities."' 6
Having found the requisite "spectator" type performance, the court then
had to show that the presentation of this performance "affects commerce" ac-
cording to the criterion of section 201 (c) (3). This would be accomplished if it
were shown that the performers (the children) "move in [interstate] com-
merce.""' As the court put it: "[W]e can not ignore the logical conclusion that
a number of the patron-performers of the Fun Fair amusement park, an essen-
tial part of Fun Fair's exhibition, move in commerce."' 8
11 Id. at 528.
12 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 348-49 (5th Cir. 1968).
13 Id. at 349-51.
14 Id. at 351-52.
15 Id. at 348.
16 Supplemental Brief for Appellants on Rehearing at 8 n.8, Miller v. Amusement Enter-
prises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968). The district court had apparently been under
the impression that the basis for this argument had been stipulated away: "[I]t [was] agreed
by all parties to this suit that no exhibitions are presented or conducted on the defendant's
premises .... ." Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523, 525 (E.D. La.
1966). Appellee's brief similarly indicates that the defendant was under the same impression:
"It has been conceded by Appellant .. . that the park is not a place of exhibition . . . "
Appellee's Brief on Rehearing at 5, Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342(5th Cir. 1968).
17 110 CONG. REc. 6557 (1964) (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
18 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1968).
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The foregoing rationale immediately invites inquiry whether a group of
children ice skating or riding a "roto-whip" can be properly said to be a per-
forming group " or an exhibition which Fun Fair presents for the amusement of
its (adult) customers. Such would at least be a novel performance in that the
entertainers rather than the entertained have paid the price of admission.20 In
a Virginia case involving an ice skating rink, and even though the spectators as
well as the participants had paid an admission fee, the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals had noted:
Moreover, if it can be justly said that on ordinary occasions there was
any public performance, because of the fact that some of those who visited
the rink were mere spectators of the exercises, it certainly cannot be said
that such performance was exhibited by the [defendant]. For those whose
movements were witnessed by the spectators were not agents or employes
of the [defendant], or in any way subject to his control; but were persons
who resorted thither for their own pleasure or amusement, and not for the
purpose of exhibiting themselves or their skills to others.n
No doubt some of the patrons of Fun Fair were amused by the antics of others,
but if this alone were sufficient to extend coverage of sections 201 (b) (3) and
201 (c) (3) to the establishment, it would follow that bowling alleys, pool halls,
and dance studios would also be covered. In these places, too, some people may
be entertained by watching as well as by doing, but the history of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act is clear that such establishments are not to be covered. Representative
Kastenmeier made this point quite explicit when he observed, "[T]he bill would
allow discrimination to continue in . .. bowling alleys, and other places of rec-
reation and participation sports, unless such places serve food."2  Senator
Magnuson, floor manager of S. 1732, the Senate version of the bill which
eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, re-emphasized this fact: "The
following establishments would, therefore, be generally exempt: . . . Dance
studios. Bowling alleys and billiard parlors."2 It might be suspected that the
Fifth Circuit recognized the tenuous nature of its literal-coverage argument when
it characterized its remarks as "not necessary to our decision. 24
The court's second task concerned the inapplicability of ejusdem generis to
the language "other place of exhibition or entertainment." In Cuevas v.
Sdrales,2" the Tenth Circuit had offered the following statement of the rule:
"Ordinarily, when specific terms in a statute are followed by general terms, the
general terms are limited to matters similar to those specified, unless to do so
would defeat the obvious purposes of the statute."2 The argument in Miller
that application of ejusdem generis would defeat the obvious purpose of the
19 This term is used in S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 '(1964).
20 Absence of an admission fee was one factor considered in determining whether piano
playing was an "exhibition" in People v. Campbell, 51 App. Div. 565, 65 N.Y.S. 114 (1900).
21 Harris v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 240, 244, 59 Am. R. 666, 668-69 (1885).
22 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1963). See Adams v. Fazzio Real
Estate Co., 268 F. Supp. 630, 633 (E.D. La. 1967).
23 110 CONG. REc. 7407 (1964).
24 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 1968).
25 344 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1014 '(1966).
26 Id. at 1020. (Citations omitted.)
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statute rested on two .grounds: 1) that the rule would give "words and phrases
embodied in the statute a definition or interpretation different from their common
and ordinary meaning,"2 7 and would render superfluous the word "entertain-
ment"; 2' and 2) that "the spirit embodied in [the] law" would be violated if
the rule were applied.'
The first of these contentions is supported in the opinion by citations to
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Rodale's Synonym Finder, and
Roget's International Thesaurus, each of which indicates that the word "enter-
tainment" includes or is synonymous with the word "amusement"" 0 The logic is
that since Fun Fair is surely a place of amusement, and since the word "enter-
tainment" contains the meaning "amusement," then Fun Fair must be a "place
of... entertainment" and hence covered by the language of section 201 (b) (3).
Judicial authority cited for this proposition consists of two cases, Cheney v. Tol-
liver3 and Young v. Board of Trustees. 2 The former asserts (paraphrasing
Webster) that "entertainment" is synonymous with "amusement"; the latter
defines "entertainment" as including "amusement," and cites Webster. In the
Cheney case, the statute under scrutiny referred to "places of amusement, . . .
athletic, entertainment, recreational events,... access to or the use of amuse-
ment, entertainment, athletic or recreational facilities . . . !"I This language
clearly included both "spectator" events ("athletic... events") and participative
activities ("use of amusement, entertainment, athletic or recreational facilities").
In Young, the phrase "public entertainments" was construed to include dancing.
The statute involved 4 contained no specific enumerations or other indications
which would limit the generic term, and it appeared that the legislature had used
the word in its broadest sense.
Analysis of other judicial constructions of these terms makes it clear that
the word "amusement" - like the word "entertainment"-- is generic, and
includes both "spectator" and "participative" activities depending upon its
context."5 On the other hand, the word "exhibition" is very restricted, and re-
fers only to "spectator" events.3 6 In each decision construing one of the generic
words, the extent of coverage is determined either by definitions in the statute7
or by consideration of the language surrounding the generic word.3" In many
27 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1968).
28 Id. at 350-51.
29 Id. at 353.
30 Id. at 351.
31 234 Ark. 973, 356 S.W.2d 636 (1962).
32 90 Mont. 576, 4 P.2d 725 (1931).
33 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1903 (1947).
34 Law of March 12, 1913, ch. 76, § 2104, Mont. Laws 298,'300 as amended Law of
March 1, 1929, ch. 48, § 1, Mont. Laws 78, 80.
35 Thus, in the absence of language that would restrict the general meaning or "distinguish
between amusements that are participative and those that are exhibitive", the word "amuse-
ment" would include both types of activity. Stiska v. City of Chicago, 405 Ill. 374, 381-83,
90 N.E.2d 742, 746-47 '(1950).
36 SeeLongwell v. Kansas City, 199 Mo. App. 480, 484, 203 S.W. 657, 659 (1918).
37 Stiska v. City of Chicago, 405 Ill. 374, 90 N.E.2d 742 (passim) (1950) (discussing
the city ordinance); Webber v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 313, 36 N.E. .70 (1894).
38 A public dance was included by the language "other public amusement" in Pearson v.
City of Seattle, 14 Wash. 438, 44 P. 884 (1896). This case *involved an ordinance which
expressly covered, inter alia, skating rinks, theaters, and shows. The court noted that the
inclusion of the skating rink (a participative amusement) made it possible to consider dancing
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cases considering the problem, the language of the statute involved has made
it clear that the word in context includes both "spectator" and "participative"
types of amusement, either by definition, as in In re City of Enid,9 or by specific
enumerations which contain examples of both types of activity, as in Pearson v.
City of Seattle.4" In such instances there can be no room for ejusdem generis,
and arguments based on the rule have been properly rejected.
In Miller the statute under scrutiny contained no such bar to the application
of ejusdem generis. Indeed, every one of the specific establishments enumerated
is of the "spectator" rather than the "participative" genus. Even the word
"exhibition," while not as specific as the words which precede it, has been
judicially interpreted to include only "spectator" or "audience" events and to
exclude "participative" activities.4 There is no language in the statute that
would indicate an intent to cover recreational facilities of a non-exhibitive nature.
Turning to the legislative history of the Act, it should be noted that all of the
twenty-two competing civil rights bills as introduced into the House and Senate
used the language "public place of amusement or entertainment" in their public
accommodations provisions.' However, H.R. 7152 as reported by the House
Judiciary Committee - the bill which became law - had substituted the re-
stricted word "exhibition" for the generic "amusement."4  Representative
Kastenmeier was of the opinion that the bill as reported did indeed make a dis-
tinction between places of spectator entertainment and places of participative
activity. He stated:
'(another participative amusement) as within the class of regulated activities. Id. at 885.
Dancing was also within coverage of an Iowa civil rights statute in Amos v. Prom, Inc., 117
F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Iowa 1954), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 214 F.2d 350 (8th Cir.
1954). This case, and its discussion of the authorities, makes it clear that the phrase "place
of amusement" in a state civil rights statute will be given general meaning when the statute
which contains it does not appear to impose any restriction on its meaning. A swimming
pool was included by the language "any [place] of public accommodation, resort or amusement"
in State v. Rosecliff Realty Co., 1 N.J. Super. 94, 62 A.2d 488 (1948). In this case, language
in the statute which might have restricted the meaning of the general terms was clearly not
intended by the legislature to be an exhaustive list of covered establishments. Furthermore,
the specific facilities mentioned included examples of both spectator and participative amuse-
ments. Id. at 100-01, 62 A.2d at 490. Bowling was within the term "amusement" in Hanover
Borough v. Criswell, 205 Pa. Super 65, 208 A.2d 39 (1965), aff'g mem. 35 Pa. D. & C.2d
203. The statute in that case evidenced an intent to cover participative activities by its use of
the words "engaging in." Also, the list of amusements specifically covered by the statute was
not intended to be exhaustive as is clear from the language "All manner and form of enter-
tainment, including but not limited to ... ." rd.
39 195 Okla. 365, 158 P.2d 348 (1945). In this case the statute contained the language:
.. places of amusements, . . . athletic, entertainment, recreational events, . . . privilege of
or having access to or the use of amusements, entertainment, athletic or recreational
facilities . . . ." There was thus drawn a distinction between "spectator" and "participative"
activities. By definition, both types were included within the purview of the statute.
40 14 Wash. 438, 44 P. 884 (1896).
41 Longwell v. Kansas City, 199 Mo. App. 480, 484, 203 S.W. 657, 659 (1918).
42 Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the
Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, pt. 1, at 652, 663, 678, 689, 700, 712, 723, 734, 745,
756, 767, 778, 789, 799, 819, 821, 832, 843, 854, 865, 888 (1963) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings]; Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 26, pt. 1, at 3 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
43 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) reprinted in Bu"Au oF NATiONAL
AFFAIRs, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT oF 1964 135, 137 (1964).
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In title II, the bill reported by the full committee -is deficient in that
it guarantees equal access to only some public accommodations, as if racial
equality were somehow divisible. Discrimination is prohibited in the re-
ported version of H.R. 7152 in all... places of entertainment and spectator
sports. At the same time, the bill would allow discrimination to continue
in... bowling alleys, and other places of recreation and participation sports,
unless such places serve food. 4" (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the original bills contained language clearly directed toward
participative amusement facilities, and which would have extended coverage to
swimming pools, tennis courts, amusement parks, and other recreational areas.
That provision covered: ". . . any . . . establishment where goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are held out to the public
for sale, use, rent, or hire .... " (Emphasis added.) This provision was con-
spicuously absent from the reported bill 6 The omission of this provision, taken
together with the simultaneous substitution of the word "exhibition" for "amuse-
ment," is strong evidence of a legislative intention to exclude recreational areas
from the coverage of section 201 (b) (3).
The only direct congressional reference to amusement parks is contained in
a statement made by Senator Humphrey."' He referred to a demonstration that
had taken place at Gwynn Oak Amusement Park, Maryland, saying:
If doubts existed prior to this weekend about the desirability of President
Kennedy's pending proposal to secure equal access to public facilities,
these events surrounding the mass arrests at Gwynn Oak Amusement Park
should have banished them.
... If ever there was proof of need of the President's program, it took
place within 40 miles of the Nation's Capital [sic] .... 48
Two points should be noted in considering this statement. First, coverage might
have extended to Gwynn Oak under sections 201 (b) (4) and 201 (c) (4) of the
statute, a real possibility which had been stipulated away in Miller2' Second,
44 H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1963).
45 House Hearings, supra note 42, at 653, 663, 678, 689, 700, 713, 723, 734, 745, 756,
767, 778, 789, 799, 810, 821, 832, 843, 854, 866, 888; Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 3.
46 H.R. REP. No. 914, supra note 44, at 2-3. Thus, while the proposed bills surely would
have covered amusement parks with this provision, the reported version makes no such attempt.
See 43 NOTRE. DA3n LAWYER 440, 444 (1968).
47 The point is advanced in Supplemental Brief for Appellants on Rehearing at 7 n.6,
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
48 109 CONG. REc. 12275-76 (1963).
49 See note 4 and accompanying text, supra. In another case involving Gwynn Oak,
Drews v. Maryland, 381 U.S. 421 (1965), certiorari was denied by the United States
Supreme Court. In his opinion dissenting to the denial of certiorari, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren noted that the 1964 Civil Rights Act covered the amusement park. He implied
(without elaboration) that section 201'(b) (3) might be applicable, but in fact based his
contention on the "captive facilities" provision of the Act. He chose to frame his argument
in the following terms:
There is a restaurant at Gwynn Oak Park; indeed petitioners were standing
next to it when they were arrested. If a substantial portion of the food served in
that restaurant has moved in interstate commerce, the entire amusement park is a
place of public accommodation under the Act. §§ 201(b) (2), 201(b) (4), 201(c).
See also § 201(b) (3). If the Court were unwilling to assume that the restaurant
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Senator Humphrey made the statement on July 9, 1963, while the administra-
tion's proposed bill was still in committee, i.e., before H.R. 7152 had been
amended by omission of the "use of facilities" provision and deletion of the
word "amusement."
Precisely the same objections are applicable to the statement of President
Kennedy which the Miller majority quoted on rehearing:
No action is more contrary to the spirit of our democracy and Constitution
- or more rightfully resented by a Negro citizen who seeks only equal
treatment - than the barring of that citizen from restaurants, hotels,
theaters, recreational areas and other public accommodations and facilities.50
(Emphasis added.)
The administration's bill in its proposed form very likely would have covered
most "recreational areas" under its "use of facilities" provision or the provision
which is presently section 201 (b) (4). But the Humphrey and Kennedy state-
ments are not entirely apposite to the Miller case.
Even if, arguendo, it is conceded that the legislative history of the Act is
"inconclusive," "obscure," or capable of "[supporting] differing interpretations"
as contended by the majority on rehearing,5 this would be yet another reason
to apply ejusdem generis. As is pointed out in the case of Hanover Borough v.
Criswell,5 cited by the majority: "[E]jusdem generis is but a rule of construction
to aid in giving effect to the legislative intent, where there is uncertainty. .... ,,3
(Emphasis added.) The rule should not be applied, said the Miller majority,"
when the result of its use would be contrary to the obvious purpose of the statute
in question."54 (Emphasis added.) If, then, the legislative history is thought
"inconclusive," and if no "obvious" purpose to include recreational establish-
ments or facilities appears from the language of the statute (as it did in Hanover
Borough), then the rule ejusdem generis should be applied to help properly dis-
cover the limits of the statute's general terms.
The third question discussed by the majority is whether the activities of
Fun Fair "affect commerce" within the meaning of section 201 (c) (3). There
can be no doubt that Fun Fair is well within the reach of a statute based on
commerce clause power.5 The Fifth Circuit places great emphasis on the facts
which connect Fun Fair with interstate commerce, and these facts are more
than adequate to show that Fun Fair could easily be reached by a federal non-
discrimination statute. It should be noted, however, that the commerce clause of
serves a substantial portion of such food, the proper course would be to remand the
case for a hearing on the issue. Id. at 428 n.10 (dissenting opinion).
An interesting possibility whereby section 201 (b) (3) might be applied to amusement
parks such as Gwynn Oak is suggested in 43 NOTRE DAeE LAWYER 445 n.40 (1968).
50 Letter from John F. Kennedy to the Congress of the United States, Feb. 28, 1963,
quoted in Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 353 '(5th Cir. 1968).
51 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1968).
52 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 203 (1964), aff'd mem., 205 Pa. Super. 65, 208 A.2d 39 (1965).
53 Id. at 206.
54 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1968) (citations
omitted).
55 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); 110 CONG. REc. 7401-04 '(1964) (remarks of
Senator Magnuson).
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the Constitution is not "self-executing.""8 It is not sufficient to show that a par-
ticular activity is within the province of congressional control; it must also be
shown that some legislation has been addressed to the particular activity and thus
exercised the power granted by the Constitution. The proper criteria for de-
termining whether Fun Fair is within the coverage of the Civil Rights Act is
the language of section 201(c) (3) and not the limits of commerce clause
authority.5" Senator Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee,
framed the question:
The commerce power is broad and plenary; and of course the com-
mittee did not have any problem as to the authority of Congress to im-
plement its power under the commerce clause. The committee's real prob-
lem was to determine how far it wished to go within this authority, as a
matter of national policy.
... [I]t appears that the question involved is not one of power but
one of policy.58
It appears from the history of the Act that the statute was not designed to
reach as far as the commerce clause power of the Constitution would allow. In a
statement before the House Judiciary Committee the Attorney General said:
[T]he principle upon which title II stands is a moral one and all forms
of racial discrimination are equally objectionable.
One can argue legitimately from this moral principle to the inclusion
of all forms of business enterprise within the reach of the Constitution. The
administration proposal did not attempt to extend Federal law so far.
• ..We were reluctant to extend Federal power beyond those areas
where it was clearly needed to meet existing problems. 59
Turning, therefore, to the language of section 201(c) (3) as the proper
guide, the same problem of construction is encountered that was dealt with in
interpreting section 201 (b) (3). The question becomes whether Fun Fair's
mechanical rides are included by the language "films, performances, athletic
teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment." All the authority tending
to show that section 201 (b) (3) was intended to cover "spectator" rather than
"participative" establishments would similarly support the application of ejusdem
generis here. The language of section 201(c) (3) contains no bar to the appli-
cation of the rule, since each of the specific terms ("films," "performances,"
"athletic teams") refers to a source of spectator entertainment. There is no
56 Cf. Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959), followed
in Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 284 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.), aff'g per curiamz
181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960).
57 With respect to inns, hotels, motels, and other places of lodging for transients, there
is clear congressional intention to exercise commerce clause powers to their limits, as is
evidenced by section 201(c) (1) of the Act. If the limits of constitutional authority were all
that congress intended to delineate the scope of section 201, all of section 201 (c) could have
been omitted. As it is, "Section 201'(c) provides the criteria for determining whether the
operations of an establishment affect commerce." H.R. REXP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1963) reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2396 (1964).
58 110 CONG. REc. 7402-03 (1964) (remarks of Senator Magnuson).
59 House Hearings, supra note 42, at 2655-56.
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specific language that would suggest coverage of recreational areas. The less
specific word "exhibition" is used here, as it was in section 201(b) (3), but it
too is a word whose meaning is confined to a source of spectator entertainment.6"
Some marginal light was shed upon the meaning of the phrase "sources
of entertainment" during the Attorney General's testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee:
[S]ome significant percentage of an establishment's performances must move
in interstate commerce ....
[ .. T]here is no requirement in the bill that the production being
presented at any given time need have moved .... 61 (Emphasis added.)
Similar language was used by Senator Magnuson in a statement made "to
assure that the will of Congress and the policies it seeks to express . . . are
effectuated by the judicial branch."6 He, too, used the words "performances"
and "production presented."6 3 The choice of such terms would seem to contem-
plate spectator or audience events rather than recreational areas.
It is not suggested that these references alone are conclusive, but when
sections 201 (b) (3) and 201 (c) (3) are read together in light of the total history
of title II, it is extremely difficult to support the majority's claim in Miller that
recreational areas are within the language or the legislative intent of these
portions of the Act."4
The Fifth Circuit in Miller is clearly loathe to perpetuate "the inconvenience,
unfairness and humiliation of racial discrimination."6 5 The court's rhetoric
reflects its indignation when it says:
This case demonstrates the evils of such discriminatory practices especially
when imposed upon a child of tender years during the formative period
of her life, which practices, no doubt, generate permanent attitudes which
become evident and active later. The venom of hate and prejudice should
not be generated and cultivated at any time, especially during the early
years of childhood.... We refuse to register our acceptance of the conduct
here involved. To do so would shock our conscience and disturb our mind.66
What has perhaps escaped adequate attention, however, is that Miller was
conceived and prosecuted as a test case to determine the coverage of specific
statutory language. There is really no question of Mrs. Miller's ability to obtain
60 See Longwell v. Kansas City, 199 Mo. App. 480, 484, 203 S.W. 657, 659 (1918).
61 House Hearings, supra note 42, at 1403.
62 110 CONG. REc. 7397 (1964).
63 Id. at 7406.
64 The distinction between that which "moves" and that which "has moved" in commerce
was heavily relied upon by the district court. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259
F. Supp. 523, 527-28 (E.D. La. 1966). But this argument was properly exposed and rejected
by the majority on rehearing. Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 351-52
(5th Cir. 1968). In addition to the authority cited by the majority, note that references in
the legislative history exhibit a conspicuous lack of a conscious distinction. See, e.g., House
Hearings, supra note 42, at 1403 (testimony of the Attorney General) where "move," "moved,"
and "have moved" are all used in the same sense. See also amendments No. 794 and 795
proposed by Senator Ervin, 110 CONG. Rac. 13915 '(1964), which were rejected by the Senate
110 CONG. REC. 13921 (1964).
65 Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 394 F.2d 342, 353 (5th Cir. 1968).
66 Id.
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relief under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, since it is all but conceded by the parties
that sections 201(b) (4) and 201(c) (4) would cover Fun Fair and most other
amusement parks of any consequence. In light of the voluntary stipulation
between the parties and considering the fact that Fun Fair and similar estab-
lishments are covered by parts of the statute not in issue, the court's moral-
indignation argument becomes less persuasive. In no sense would a holding
that Fun Fair is excluded by the language of sections 201 (b) (3) and 201 (c) (3)
be "to register... acceptance of the conduct ... involved." Such a holding
might, on the other hand, go far in providing the clarity called for by Attorney
General Robert Kennedy when he said, "[T]he areas of coverage should be
clear to both the proprietors and the public .... ,,67
Richard H. Farina
CLASS ACTIONS - FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23 - RELIANCE
ON NUMBERS TO DETERMINE ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION IS UNWARRANTED
- NOTICE IS REQUIRED IN ALL CLASS ACTIONS. - Between the years 1960 and
1966, Morton Eisen, a New York wholesale shoe salesman, engaged in 47 odd-
lot' transactions on the New York Stock Exchange, paying a total of $259 in
odd-lot differentials.' In 1966 he brought a class action, on behalf of himself and
an estimated 3,750,000 other individuals and corporate buyers and sellers of
odd-lots during this six year period, against Carlisle & Jacquelin, De Coppet
& Doremus and the New York Stock Exchange. He alleged that the two broker-
age firms, which handle 99% of the volume of odd-lots on the New York Ex-
change,' had combined and conspired to monopolize odd-lot trading by fixing
the odd-lot differential at an excessive rate in violation of the Sherman Act.4 The
New York Exchange was joined as a defendant on the premise that it had failed
to discharge its duties to insure fair dealing and to protect investors according
to the rules and regulations established by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered
that the suit be dismissed as a class action because Eisen failed to demonstrate
that he could adequately protect the interests of the class. 6 In reversing the dis-
67 House Hearings supra note 42, at 2655.
1 The regular unit of trading on the Exchange is the "round lot" of 100 shares. An
"odd-lot" is the term used to designate transactions involving less than 100 shares. Odd-lot
orders do not form part of the "regular auction market" but are exclusively handled by special
odd-lot dealers who buy and sell for their own account as principals. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 The cost to the customer of an odd-lot transaction includes both a standard commission
payable to a brokerage firm and an odd-lot differential which is received by the odd-lot dealer.
The differential is a figure amounting to a fraction of a point for each share traded which is
added to the customer's price. During the years 1960 to 1966, the odd-lot differential was 1/6
of a point (12Y2 cents) per share on stock selling below $40, and 4 of a point (25 cents) per
share on stock selling at $40 or more. Id.
3 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY Or SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 95, pt. 2,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1963).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78f(d), 78s(a) (1964).
6 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 391 F.2d 555
(1968). A motion to dismiss Eisen's appeal on the ground that the district court's order of
dismissal was not a "final order" was denied by Judge Kaufman of the court of appeals. Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 '(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
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trict court's order and remanding for evidentiary proceedings, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held: reliance on quantitative elements
to determine adequacy of representation is unwarranted, and thus additional
information concerning class members and the complexity of the administration
of the suit was needed before a proper determination under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(c) (1) could be made. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F. 2d 555 (1968).
The origin of the class suit was described by Justice Stone in Hansberry v.
Lee' as
[a]n invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where
the number of those interested in the subject of litigation is so great that
their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is
impracticable.8
Thus, the class action is essentially a creature of necessity which, in allowing
one or more members of a class to bring an action on behalf of the entire class,
serves the important function of providing claimants with a method of obtaining
redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual
litigation.9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, as originally enacted in 1937"°
(hereinafter Old Rule 23), offered three categories of class actions which re-
flected the "jural relationships of the members of the class."' 1 These categories
were defined
in terms of the abstract nature of the rights involved: the so-called "true'
category was defined as involving "joint, common, or secondary rights";
the "hybrid" category, as involving "several" rights related to "specific
property"; the "spurious" category, as involving "several" rights affected by
a common question and related to common relief.12
There were significant differences in the res judicata effect of the various class
actions. For example, while the judgments in the "true" and "hybrid" class
actions would extend to the entire class, the judgment in a "spurious" type would
only extend to the parties and intervenors. 3 This limitation of the "spurious"
category detracted from its usefulness as a class action and made it merely a
permissive joinder device." In some instances, class members were permitted to
intervene after a favorable judgment even though they were not bound by an
unfavorable one.' This "one-way intervention" created an "everything to gain,
nothing to lose" proposition which frustrated the class action's function of settling
all questions in one suit. 6
7 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
8 Id. at 41.
9 Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHri. L. Ryv.
684, 714 (1941).
10 Class Action R. 23, 39 F.R.D. 94 (1966).
11 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.08, at 3434 (2d ed. 1968).
12 Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1965).
13 Id.
14 3A J. MooRE, supra note 11, 1 23.10, at 3442; see, e.g., California Apparel Creators v.
Wieder of California, 162 F.2d 893, 897 '(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
15 Hohmann v. Packard Instrument, 43 F.R.D. 192, 195 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
16 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 9, at 699-70.
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In an attempt to cure the restricted res judicata effect of the spurious class
action and other deficiencies of Old Rule 23, the rule was completely revised
in July, 1966"r (hereinafter New Rule 23). Under (c) (1) of New Rule 23,
the court determines by order "as soon as practicable after the commencement
of an action" whether it can be maintained as a class action. The court's de-
termination is based on the satisfaction of the four prerequisites listed in 23(a),
and fulfillment of one of the four additions noted in subdivision (b). s Although
no mention is made of Old Rule 23 categories, (b) (1) and (b) (2) embrace
the "true" and "hybrid" categories, while "(b) (3) bears many resemblances to
the old spurious category."'" However, in spite of these resemblances, the
spurious class action had undergone vital changes.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin is the first court of appeals case interpreting
a portion of New Rule 23 which was not contained in the Old Rule."° For this
17 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 12, at 98-99.
18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b) provides:(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representa-
tive parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual mem-
bers of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
'(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; '(B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced
by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.19 Address on Some Preliminary Observations concerning Civil Rule 23 by Marvin B.
Frankel, Eighth Circuit's Judicial Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, Sept. 18, 1967, in 43
F.R.D. 39, 43 (1968).
20 Three cases had reached the federal court of appeals level previously. Two of these
cases, Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
827 (1968), and Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), did not interpret
the text of New Rule 23, and the other, Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967),
involved an aspect handled in the same manner under both Old and New Rule 23. Alvarez and
Coburn presented opposing views on aggregation of claims of the entire class in order to satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. While Alvarez upheld the prin-
ciple established under the Old Rule that claims could not be aggregated to meet the $10,000
amount in controversy requirement in cases that would have been classified as "spurious",
Coburn held that since aggregation of claims was allowed in some class actions under the Old
Rule (notably the "true" category), the New Rule's elimination of the "true, hybrid, and
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alone it will achieve notoriety. But Eisen additionally offers an astonishing
result to those who are befuddled by pure numbers. It upholds the possibility
that one person can represent a class of well over three million.
Both Old and New Rule 23 require the representative of the class to ade-
quately protect the interest of the class.2 However, adequate representation is
more strictly interpreted under New Rule 23, since, unlike the analogous spurious
class action of the Old Rule, this section now provides that all members of the
class are bound by the judgment unless they specifically ask to be excluded.22
The two primary ingredients that enable one to be termed an adequate rep-
resentative were listed by Judge Medina in Eisen as 1) representation by a
qualified attorney, and 2) complete absence of any interests antagonistic to
those of the absent members of the class.21 Special attention is focused on de-
nouncing any determination of adequacy according to sheer numbers.24 While
the history of Old Rule 23(a) apparently made it clear to some courts and com-
mentators that number is not in itself determinative of adequacy or inadequacy
of representation,25 certain decisions had watered down this early thought.
Indicative of this weakening process are the often quoted statement in Pelelas
v. Caterpillar Tractor Company 6 that "[t]here must be a sufficient number of
persons to insure a fair representation of the class"2 and the Second Circuit's
statement in Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Company:2
If it shall later appear that the plaintiffs are not able within a reasonable
time to obtain others to intervene in the class action it may properly be
dismissed as a class action because of lack of adequate representation of
members of the class.29
Especially noticeable in the Eisen court's denunciation of this "numbers block"
is the underlying emphasis given to the function of the class action as a device
for vindicating small claims which otherwise would not be litigated. To uphold
the necessity of some proportional numerical representation of the class for
maintenance of a class action would defeat, in most cases, this very function."
Subdivision (b) (3) serves as the appellate court's springboard into viewing
the new portions of New Rule 23. To qualify as a class action under (b) (3),
the court must be convinced that common questions predominate over individual
questions and that the class action is the superior method for the fair and ef-
ficient adjudication of the controversy."' Plaintiff's alleged conspiracy between
spurious" categories places the claims of the entire class in controversy in all class actions.
Anderson was a Fifth Circuit decision denying the use of a class action because the representa-
tive and the class members had conflicting interests in the subject matter of the suit.
21 Class Action R. 23(a), 39 F.R.D. 94-95 (1966); FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (4).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (B); Hohmann v. Packard Instrument, 43 F.R.D. 192, 197
(N.D. Ill. 1967).
23 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
24 Id. at 563.
25 3A J. MooRE, supra note 11, 1 23.07 at 3430.
26 113 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1940).
27 Id. at 632.
28 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944).
29 Id. at 390.
30 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
31 FaD. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
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the two brokerage firms gives rise to a "common nucleus of operative facts." 2
Under the New Rule, common questions arising out of anti-trust violations have
already been accepted as sufficient to deserve class action treatment"
The question of whether the class action is the superior method for adjudica-
tion of the controversy can be answered only by a survey of the possible alterna-
tives. Among the various alternative procedural devices are joinder, interven-
tion, consolidation and the test case. 4 However, as Judge Frankel has pointed
out, these devices presuppose economically powerful parties who are able and
willing to take care of their own interests individually by means of individual
suits or individual decisions about joinder or intervention.5 Thus the majority
of the Second Circuit felt bound by Judge Kaufman's holding on a prior appeal 6
that, effectively, the class action is the only possible way of litigating the issue
due to the small individual claims 7
Nevertheless, since (b) (3) type class actions are geared to achieving econ-
omies of time, effort and expense,3" the class action's ability to resolve the con-
troversy in a fair and efficient manner was still at issue. A class which has a
membership of over three million, scattered across the world, hints at being
administratively unmanageable by its very nature. In following Judge Kauf-
man's ruling, the Eisen court does not turn its head on this presumably ob-
vious fact of complex manageability. In fact, one of the four factors helpful in
assessing satisfaction of New Rule 23 (b) (3) confronts this very problem -
"the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action."3 "
Yet, without specific data showing that inordinate paper work costs and attorney
fees will absorb the entire judgment, the Second Circuit professed to be un-
influenced by the multitudinous population of the class and unwilling to deviate
from Judge Kaufman's ruling. As an indicator for future class actions, this warns
counsel who may have clients sued by numerous-membered classes to be pre-
pared to detail analogous situations in which filing claims, fees and all other ex-
penses surpass any eventual recovery.
Another serious obstacle to plaintiff's maintenance of a class action is the
notice requirement of New Rule 23 (c) (2). While the class action has the ex-
ceptional status of settling absent members' rights without their day in court, it
is of course not relieved from the fourteenth amendment's requirements of due
process. In the words of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, 0
upon which the notice provision of New Rule 23 is patterned, this includes "notice
32 See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
33 Id.
34 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Although some resort to
remedying the alleged conspiracy among the defendants may be available through an adminis-
trative agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, such an agency does not
provide a feasible alternative when private claims are at stake. Id.
35 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 567 n.19 (2d Cir. 1968), citing Frankel,
Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, Symposium on Amended Rule 23, 32 ABA
ANTIRUST L.J. 251, 295-98 (1966).
36 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 (1967).
37 Judge Kaufman had implied that $70 was a reasonable estimate of Eisen's damages. Id.
38 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 12, at 102.
39 FED.R. Cr. P. 23 (b) (3) (D).
40 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
[Vol. 44:151]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."4 Although New Rule 23 contains both mandatory [(c) (2)] and
discretionary [(d) (2)] notice provisions which are designed to fulfill the notice
requirements of due process, it is unclear according to the face of the New Rule
whether notice is a universal requirement for all class actions. Only with an
attentive reading of the Advisory Committee's Note can this be ascertained.42
For any class action brought under (b) (3), provision (c) (2) demands a
special type of notice. The mandatory notice of (c) (2) essentially advises the
members of the class that, unless they exclude themselves from the class, they will
be included under the court's judgment, whether favorable or not.43 In addition,
it provides that the "notice is to be the best practicable under the circumstances,
and shall include individual notice to the members who can be identified through
reasonable effort."" (Emphasis added.) Since the burden of furnishing notice
to the class members rests upon the representative party when he is the plaintiff,"
it would cost Eisen approximately $400,000 to individually notify each of the
3,750,000 members of the class.4" In order not to forfeit continuance of the class
action because of this prohibitive cost, Eisen interpreted (c) (2) as permitting
a less expensive means of notice - namely, publication.4" Notice by publication
is by no means new to class action decisions. It was accepted in Booth v. General
Dynamics Corporation" as satisfying the due process requirement to inform
several hundred thousands of taxpayers of a suit on their behalf. Of course, in
Booth the necessity for preserving the taxpayer action device was attributed to
be the controlling point in allowing notice by publication even though the court
had determined it would take more than a reasonable effort to identify all mem-
bers of the class. 9
Understandably, the Second Circuit agrees with Judge Tyler of the district
court that publication to all members will not satisfy due process requirements.
To hold otherwise would be a sacrifice of absent members' rights solely for eco-
nomic considerations."0 But an alternative is submitted. Individual notice is not
uncompromisingly the only method by which the due process notice requirement
can be satisfied. The Mullane case holds that, when the identity of the members
of the class are known or very easily ascertainable, notice by publication will not
41 Id. at 314.
42 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 12, at 106-07.
43 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2) (A), (B).
44 Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 12, at 105.
45 School District v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-05 (E.D.
Pa. 1967), suggests that it is the court's task to prepare and forward notice and to maintain
the clerical facilities for fulIfilling the resultant paper work. However, this suggestion seems
unwarranted, as pointed out by Professor Kaplan in Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1066 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HAv. L. Ry. 356, 398
(1967). Only control must be maintained by the court, to insure accuracy and impartiality.
The plaintiff must bear the expense for the mechanics of publication and distribution. See
Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936 (D. Mass. 1962).
46 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 568 (2d Cir. 1968).
47 Id.
48 264 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Il. 1967).
49 Id. at 471.
50 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 569 (2d Cir. 1968).
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suffice.51 However, as clearly pointed out by the Supreme Court in City of New
York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,2 "when the names, in-
terests and addresses of persons are unknown, plain necessity may cause a resort
to publication." 3 It is- in this light that the Eisen court seems to offer the half-
way proposition that through evidentiary hearings it can be established who are
the most frequent transactors of odd-lots. To these buyers and sellers who will be
more easily ascertainable, individual notice will be required to satisfy the due
process requirements; while to the remainder of the class, notice by publication
may suffice." This latter determination is left up to the discretion of the district
court after its findings on class membership. If the plaintiff is unable to afford
the expenditures required in giving notice to those whom the district court finds
deserving, then the class action will be dismissed for failure to comply with
(c) (2) of New Rule 23."
The inconsistency in the lower courts' interpretations of (c) (2) which is
alleged by the court in Eisen" stems from the variants allowed by due process.
The three cases cited by Judge Medina differ in their modes of notice because
of the attendant fact situations. Decisions such as Harris v. Jones" show that
where names and addresses of class members are "readily" available, individual
notice must be obtained. The case of Richland v. Cheatham,"' involving a class
of 50,000 purchases of stock, is not a true barometer of the lower court's holding
on New Rule 23 (c) (2), since there the class action's dismissal was rooted in a
dispute among plaintiffs about the necessity of notice - not a particular medium
of giving notice. The Booth case presents the pragmatic variant of satisfying due
process by publication in those special cases where no other type of notice is
feasible because of the anonymity of the absent members of the class. Eisen is
a half-breed species between Harris and Booth, calling for a combination of
individual notice and notice by publication. This too, is not an original concept;
it was presented as a method of satisfying the notice provision of New Rule 23
(c) (2) in Dolgow v. Anderson.59 Thus, as initial decisions indicate, the (c) (2)
notice provision of New Rule 23 seems to have been so drafted as to be flexible
enough to accurately encompass due process requirements.
Whether Morton Eisen will ultimately be allowed to maintain his class
action against the brokerage firms of Carlisle & Jacquelin and DeCoppet &
Doremus and against the New York Stock Exchange will be determined by the
facts collected at the evidentiary hearings on remand. As is witnessed by the
calling of these evidentiary hearings, the immediacy of the determination of an
order under New Rule 23 (c) (1), which is to be made "as soon as practicable,"
is tempered by the knowledge that without this class action, no individual action
will prevail. Inherent in the Second Circuit's decision in Eisen is a liberal in-
51 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950); see also
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962).
52 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
53 Id. at 296 '(dictum).
54 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 569-70 '(2d Cir. 1968).
55 Id. at 570.
56 Id. at 569.
57 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
58 272 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
59 43 F.R.D. 472, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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terpretation of New Rule 23 which indicates that a class action will not be dis-
missed when the plaintiff has complied with the face of the rule. This interpre-
tation seeks to reconfirm the concept that it is the function of the class action
that is paramount. Thus in Eisen the Second Circuit has strongly affirmed the
proposition that, in class actions, once the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been
met, there is no magic in numbers.
Thomas J. DeLuca
CRIMINAL LAW - JUVENILE COURTS - IN RE GAULT HELD TO HAVE
RETROACTIVE EFFECT SO THAT JUVENILES CONVICTED WITHOUT REPRESENTA-
TION BY COUNSEL ARE ENTITLED TO NEW TRIAL. - By orders dated March 9,
1967, two juveniles, Johnnie J. Billie and Leroy Jewelryman, were conmmitted
to the Arizona State Industrial School. Their commitments were ordered without
their having had the benefit of counsel, and, as was later stipulated," without
their having been advised either personally or through their parents that they
had a right to counsel. After the United States Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in In re Gault,' both minors petitioned for writs of habeas corpus, urging
that Gault provided a basis for the reversal of their convictions. The Arizona
Court of Appeals granted the writs and ordered the immediate release of the
juveniles.3 The State appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which vacated
the writs and held: juveniles convicted without the benefit of counsel before the
Gault decision are entitled to a reversal of their convictions, but their cases must
be remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. Application of Billie,
436 P.2d 130 (Ariz. 1968).
Among the many recent Supreme Court decisions of significance in criminal
or criminally related areas, one of the most momentous is In re Gault, where,
for only the second time in its history, the Court addressed itself to the question
of the applicability of constitutional safeguards in juvenile proceedings.4 Justice
Fortas, speaking for the Court in that since widely acclaimed5 decision, pro-
nounced it to be law that juveniles accused of crime are to be accorded the same
constitutional privileges and safeguards now commonly available to adults.
Specifically, the Court held that in order for a determination of delinquency
and commitment to a state institution to be constitutionally valid, the child and
his parent or guardian must receive such notice of a hearing as would be deemed
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.6 It noted that under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the child and his parent
must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by
them, and if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed
1 Application of Billie, 436 P.2d 130, 131 (1968).
2 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3 Application of Billie, 429 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967), vacated, 436 P.2d 130
(1968).
4 The Court first considered constitutional criminal safeguards in their relation to the
special status of juveniles in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
5 See, e.g., Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Re-
appraisal, 53 VA. L. REv. 1700 (1967).
6 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
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to represent the child;' it also extended the rights of confrontation and cross-
examination to child and parent as a matter of due process.' Finally, the Court
held that the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment applies to juveniles as well as to adults.'
The Gault decision was, however, incomplete. It did not indicate whether
the absence of counsel was a factor demanding reversal in all situations, or only
in those where the case appeared by way of appeal. The Court also failed to
establish procedures that state law enforcement agencies could follow in the event
that juveniles' convictions were reversed by writs of habeas corpus.
It clearly appeared from Gault that the Court fully intended to make age
a constitutionally irrelevant factor in the adjudication process,1 ° and thus to
extend to the minor all the constitutional rights presently secured to adults who
are accused of committing a crime. However, the very nature of the proceedings
before it prevented the Court from being explicit on a related aspect that for
some time at least will have as much relevance as the fundamental determina-
tions made in Gault. As Justice Fortas indicated in his opening remarks, the
case appeared by way of appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Arizona."1 Therefore, the Court did not deal with the procedural problem-
not instantly before it but which has subsequently arisen several times - of
whether the Court's new rules for the administration of the judicial process in
juvenile cases are to be applied only to those cases which arise for decision after
the date of Gault, or whether the Gault requirements must also be extended to
cases that had already become final before Gault was handed down. Specifically,
this problem involves the juvenile who has been convicted, imprisoned, and
has subsequently exhausted all his appellate remedies - a condition usually
referred to as one of "pure retroactivity."' 2 Having exhausted all of his ordinary
remedies, the applicant's only recourse is a collateral attack on his conviction
by means of a writ of habeas corpus based on the argument that his conviction,
seen in the light of some precedent-shattering decision of the Supreme Court,
was unlawfully obtained.
Whether a juvenile, presently detained and having already exhausted all
his ordinary appellate remedies, may successfully attack his conviction through
a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he has been deprived of one of the safe-
guards set out in Gault presents a complex legal issue, and signals practical
7 Id. at 41.
8 Id. at 56-57.
9 Id. at 55.
10 The National Probation and Parole Association in its Standard Juvenile Court Act has
attempted to distinguish three phases in the treatment of juvenile cases: first, the petition
phase; next, the adjudication phase; and finally, the disposition phase. Since recognition has
recently been given to the fact that the greatest defect in the parens patriae system lies in its
informal handling of the actual judging process, present endeavors have tended to formalize
the adjudication phase, while maintaining informality in the petition and disposition phases.
See NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS'N, STANDARD JUVENILE CouRT ACT (6th ed.
1959).
11 Appeal was taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
12 For an extensive treatment of the entire area of retroactivity, see Note, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 206 '(1965). Another method of arriving at a situation of pure retroactivity
occurs simply when the applicable juvenile statute makes no provision for appeal from a court
decision. Arizona law, similar to that of many other states, made no such provision. See ARuz.
RBv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2101 (1956).
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problems that are likely to cause law enforcement officials some amount of
anxiety. While not all aspects of the Gault requirements have yet been utilized
as vehicles for attacking the conviction of such a juvenile, one of them has come
to be emphasized much more than the others. This is the requirement that the
minor be represented by counsel.
Several jurisdictions have had to decide whether the counsel requirement
is to be applied to convictions obtained before the Gault decision as well as to
those obtained after it -that is, whether the decision is to be applied retroac-
tively or merely prospectively.?3 The court which has most recently faced this
issue is the Supreme Court of Arizona, from which the Gault decision was
originally appealed.
In the Application of Billie, the Arizona court first turned to the treatment
accorded the problem by two other jurisdictions which had dealt with the
question. These jurisdictions had seemingly split in their results, with the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals holding against retroactivity, and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts holding for it. The former announced its deci-
sion in In re Wylie,14 and the latter in Marsden v. Commonwealth,5 both of
which were decided in June, 1967.
Wylie involved a juvenile who was accused of having committed an act
which could have been the basis for any or all of three possible felony charges.
In the petition, however, he was formally charged only with being "involved."
He was found by a jury to have so been "involved" and was committed to the
National Training School. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding
that the jury's verdict of "involved" was too vague and indefinite to satisfy the
requirements of due process.16 However, the court indicated, significantly, that
it did not consider the requirements of Gault to be retrospective, for it stated:
Our ruling with respect to the necessity for notice of the specific issues,
specific instructions on such issues, and disapproval of the use of the verdict
of involved shall apply only in this case and trials occurring after this date.'
Marsden v. Commonwealth concerned a minor, 13 or 14 years old at the
time of the proceedings, who was committed as a delinquent to the Massachusetts
Youth Service Board on September 2, 1965. The case arose as a stubborn-child
proceeding in which the minor's mother was the petitioner. Marsden was orig-
inally brought before the municipal court, and, as the supreme judicial court
commented on appeal, "the record shows that Marsden was not effectively
afforded the right to counsel to which he was entitled under the Gault de-
cision.""8 The reviewing court therefore concluded that the petitioner was en-
titled to have the determinations of delinquency set aside and receive a new
13 Steinhauer v. State, 206 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1968); Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156
S.E.2d 874 (1967); Marsden v. Commonwealth, 227 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1967).
14 231 A.2d 81 '(D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
15 227 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1967).
16 In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81, 83 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
17 Id.
18 Marsden v. Commonwealth, 227 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1967).
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hearing, even though the judge of the municipal court in 1965 could not have
foreseen the Gault decision. 9
Finding itself confronted by what appeared to be a split in the authorities,
the Arizona court turned to previous decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States for guidance. The Supreme Court had established certain guide-
lines to be used in determining whether a decision is to be given retroactive effect.
It must be pointed out, however, that these are at best only guidelines, and not
definitive statements of proper application in each instance. The Arizona court,
in passing on the instant applications, examined in detail the three most recent
Supreme Court decisions which incorporated these guidelines. The first, Link-
letter v. Walker,2" involved a state prisoner whose judgment of conviction had
become final prior to the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio.2 ' Being in the pure
retroactivity situation, he attacked his conviction by habeas corpus proceedings
on the ground that evidence used against him at his trial was obtained by an
unlawful search and seizure. The Court introduced its opinion with an historical
survey of the conflicting attitudes toward the proper method of determining
retroactivity. It then declared that the Mapp decision had for its prime purpose
the extension of the exclusionary rule so that it would serve as an effective deter-
rent to illegal police action. The Court concluded: "We cannot say that this
purpose would be advanced by making the rule retrospective."2' Three reasons
were given for its decision against retroactive application: 1) the delicate bal-
ance of state-federal harmony would be further jeopardized ;23 2) "the ruptured
privacy of the victim's home and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too
late" ;24 and 3) on consideration of the interests in the administration of justice
and the integrity of the judicial process, making Mapp retrospective would tax
the administration of justice to the utmost." The pragmatic nature of the process
of determining whether a particular case should be applied retrospectively was
aptly summarized in the following statement: "[W]e must then weigh the merits
and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question,
its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard
its operation."2 6
The Billie court set out these guidelines without comment and then turned
to another recent Supreme Court decision, Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott.2
Tehan concerned the retroactive effect of the holding in Griffin v. California,"
which had made it constitutionally impermissible for a prosecutor to comment
on the accused's failure to testify. After deliberation, the Court concluded that
Griffin was not to be applied retroactively. Asserted among the reasons for this
determination was the fact that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-
19 Id.
20 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
21 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp had held that evidence seized in violation of the defen-
dant's fourth amendment rights could not be used against the defendant.
22 Linkdetter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 629.
27 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
28 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth, but stands as a
protection of the associated value of preventing a person from being forced to
testify against himself.29 Further, the Tehan Court noted that the states had
long placed reliance on the previously established rule allowing comment by the
prosecutor." In the same vein, it pointed out that potential retrial of every per-
son convicted in a trial in which comment was made regarding failure to testify
"would have an impact upon the administration of [the states'] criminal law so
devastating as to need no elaboration."'"
The final member of the "trinity of retroactivity," Johnson v. New Jersey,"3
was also closely examined in the Billie opinion. The Johnson rationale was
impressive to the Arizona court, which pointed out that in Johnson, the Supreme
Court was "concerned with a question of probabilities and must take account,
among other factors, of the extent to which other safeguards are available to
protect the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial." 3
Having set out relevant portions of the Johnson opinion, the Arizona court
had exhausted its authority on the point, and therefore proceeded to the prac-
tical mechanics of disposing of the case. It assumed in passing that
because of the shortness of the interval in which juveniles committed to
the Industrial School at Fort Grant are actually held there, we cannot say
that in Arizona a retroactive application of the Gault rulings will "seriously
disrupt the administration" of the juvenile court laws. 4
The Arizona Supreme Court apparently agreed with the Arizona Court
of Appeals that the clear thrust of the Supreme Court's "trinity of retroactivity"
led to the inescapable conclusion that lack of counsel for accused minors was
such a fundamental constitutional deprivation as to require reversal of their
convictions, despite the practical considerations involved. However, the court
failed to detail its reasons for this conclusion. Although its disposition of the
applications differs from the court of appeal's in the significant particular that
the juveniles were not unconditionally released, but were remanded to the juvenile
court for further proceedings, 5 the Arizona Supreme Court failed to indicate
its reasons for vacating the lower court's writs of habeas corpus.
While this disposition achieves substantially the correct legal result, the
opinion is devoid of legal persuasion. For example, while the Wylie case is
referred to as "some" authority against retroactivity, the Arizona court does
not indicate sufficiently that the petitioner in Wylie was not in the pure retro-
activity situation. As noted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Wylie's
29 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 419 (1966).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 384 U.S. 719 (1966). In Johnson, the Court refused to give Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), retroactive effect. Escobedo
and Miranda had established a rigid standard of conduct for police to observe while conduct-
ing in-custody investigations. The purpose in establishing such a standard was to protect the
fifth and sixth amendment rights of the accused.
33 Application of Billie, 436 P.2d 130, 135 (Ariz. 1968), quoting from Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
34 Application of Billie, 436 P.2d 130, 136 (Ariz. 1968).
35 Id.
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case appeared as an appeal, and a decision was delayed until after the Gault
ruling was handed down.3 6 Further, the Wylie decision concerned one of the
other admonitions of Gault, the notice-of-charges requirement. It did not directly
concern the absence of counsel for the accused juvenile. Therefore, the Arizona
Supreme Court need not have determind that the jurisdictions were split in
their results, for Wylie is at best only analogously relevant, and is far from being
directly on point."
The Arizona court also failed to extract from the three Supreme Court
cases - Linkletter, Tehan and Johnson - the fundamental thesis that decisions
regarding retroactivity vary on the basis of degree, and not kind. Running
throughout these decisions is the undercurrent theme that basic violations of
justice which render the truth-determining process a nullity must be corrected
without regard to the exigencies of the situation. If the Arizona court was con-
vinced that lack of counsel was such a violation, it did not indicate the reasons
for its conclusion.
On the practical level, one of the fundamental problems which faces any
court that has to make a determination regarding retroactivity is the "flood-
gate" argument.3 " The possibility of releasing thousands of prisoners into the
mainstream of society because some technical point of procedure has not been
complied with undoubtedly has forceful repercussions in an otherwise abstract
consideration of the legal issue. What the Arizona court had ultimately to decide
was whether it should hold the Gault decision retroactive and risk the possibility
that many "incorrigible" juveniles would be released into society, or hold against
it and possibly upset the progress made by the Supreme Court in Gault. In
offering as one of its major points of consideration the fact that judicial notice
could be taken of the widespread knowledge that juveniles detained in Arizona
were released at or near their eighteenth birthday, however, the court was mili-
tating against the very thrust of Gault, for it was applying special treatment to
juveniles on the basis of their age and that alone. It appears that the Arizona
Supreme Court, in attempting to answer the question of whether in fact another
Gideon's Trumpet had been sounded,39 was unwilling to approach the problem
squarely from a legal standpoint, as the United States Supreme Court in Gault
had demanded.
A sister jurisdiction (in an opinion not alluded to by the Billie court) had
been confronted by the admission of the State Attorney General that Gault, on
the basis of Gideon, had to be applied retroactively in the case of juveniles who
had been convicted without the benefit of counsel. Thus, in State ex rel. La-
36 In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81, 82 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
37 The Wylie decision does evidence, however, the great amount of attention all the
requirements outlined in Gault have been receiving.
38 See Note, supra note 12, at 213-14.
39 The dear "adult" analog in recent Supreme Court decisions is of course Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965).
The federal courts have consistently interpreted Gideon as having retroactive
effect. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed itself to the retroactiv-
ity of the Gideon rule, it has indicated such by remanding per curiam over 40 pre-
Gideon convictions in light of Gideon v. Wainwright. Note, supra note 12, at 209
n.21 (citations omitted).
For an account of the effects of Gideon, see A. Lawis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
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Follette v. Circuit Court of Brown County," the principal point of contention
shifted quickly to an examination of the procedures to be followed in dealing
with affected juveniles once writs of habeas corpus had been granted. The State
contended that the proper course for the granting authority necessarily had to
include a remand to the initiating juvenile court for further action consistent
with the juvenile's now recognized constitutional protections.
An examination of LaFollette indicates that as a matter of fact the principal
dispute in the Application of Billie did not center on the issue of retroactivity,
but rather on the ultimate disposition of the juveniles. The Arizona Court of
Appeals had determined previously that a retroactive application was to be
made.4 ' Indeed, its final order directed the preparation of an "appropriate writ
of habeas corpus directing the immediate release of the petitioners." (Emphasis
added.) "2 It was the considered opinion of the court of appeals that the exi-
gencies that might be raised by any exodus of detained juveniles would be of
far less consequence than any similar mass release of adult felons, and that in
any event their detention had been determined by the United States Supreme
Court to be illegal.4 3
While the Arizona Supreme Court is silent as to its reasons for doing so,
it stated:
Nevertheless, upon issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in a pro-
ceeding attacking the legality of detention in a juvenile institution by virtue
of failure of due process under Gault, the juveniles should be returned to
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, for such further proceedings as are
appropriate. (Emphasis added.) 44
There appears from the opinion no reasoning to buttress this disposition of the
applications; however, an examination of the similar case of LaFollette indicates
that this is the substantially correct legal course. In LaFollette, Chief Justice
Currie of the Wisconsin Supreme Court phrased the issue in this manner:
"Does a habeas court have the authority and the duty to remand to the juris-
diction of the juvenile court of originating commitment petitioners who have
successfully challenged their juvenile commitments?"45 He answered the ques-
tion affirmatively, reasoning from an interpretation of the applicable Wisconsin
statute on habeas corpus.", The essential criterion to be used in deciding whether
a remand must be granted with the writ is a determination of whether juris-
diction had initially been properly obtained. In other words, if the legal error
did not occur until after the petitioner was properly before the original juvenile
authority, the correct action for the habeas court is a granting of the writ plus
a remand to the originating court for further proceedings. The Wisconsin Stat-
40 155 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1967).
41 Application of Billie, 429 P.2d 699, 702 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Application of Billie, 436 P.2d 130, 136 (Ariz. 1968).
45 State ex rel. LaFollette v. Cir. Ct. Brown County, 155 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Wis. 1967).
46 For a discussion of the Wisconsin statutes and their similarity to the Arizona habeas
corpus statutes, see text accompanying notes 47-51 infra.
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ute'7 indicates that complete, total discharge can be had only in cases where
the fundamental processes of obtaining jurisdiction have in some way not been
legally correct.4 8 Chief Justice Currie concluded that "if a juvenile's trial court
record reveals a petition and an appearance. in court, which are not under attack
by the juvenile, the requisite jurisdiction for remand appears." 9
It seems fairly certain that the Arizona Supreme Court would have bol-
stered its position considerably had it included in its opinion in Billie a treatment
of its own habeas corpus statutes, which are substantially similar to those of
Wisconsin. For example, the pertinent Arizona statute provides:
If the time during which the party may be legally detained in custodyhas not expired, and he is detained in custody -by virtue of process issued
by any court, judge or agency of the United States, in an action where
such court, judge or agency has exclusive jurisdiction, or by virtue of the
final judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, or of any
process issued upon such judgment or decree, the person shall not be dis-
charged. (Emphasis added.) 0
It is also stipulated by statute that complete and total discharge may be had
only where jurisdiction has been illegally obtained."1 These statutes would seem
therefore to justify the disposition of the applications made by the Arizona
Supreme Court.
Any juvenile who has been tried without benefit of counsel, convicted, and
ordered detained in a juvenile institution as of a date prior to Gault should
heretofore have adequate redress through a writ of habeas corpus or similar
collateral proceeding. The juvenile can urge that Gault, on the authority of
Gideon v. Wainwright, should be applied retroactively. Whether juveniles in
such a position should be immediately released or remanded to the jurisdiction
of the originating juvenile court ordinarily will pivot around the applicable state
habeas corpus statutes. A statute that orders a remand unless the legal error
occurred in obtaining jurisdiction over the juvenile will provide state authorities
with a sufficient degree of flexibility to determine those cases in which there is
a practical feasibility in retrial of the juvenile, and those in which the state
should not attempt retrial. In the light of past experiences, 2 it may be expected
that the latter group will dominate, resulting in the outright release of anyjuveniles who had been convicted without the benefit of counsel.
James Webster
47 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 292.22 (1958).
48 Id.
49 State ex rel. LaFollette v. Cir. Ct. Brown County, 155 N.W.2d 141, 149 '(Wis. 1967).50 Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2011(B) (1956).
51 Apiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2012 (1956).
52 Anthony Lewis, in Gideon's Trumpet, commented on the consequences of Gideon inFlorida alone: "The results were spectacular. By January 1, 1964, nine hundred seventy-sixprisoners had been released outright from Florida penitentiaries, the authorities feeling they
could not be successfully retried." A. Lawis, supra note 39, at 205.
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